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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(j). On
November 5, 2007, the Third District Court, Judge John Paul Kennedy presiding, signed
a Revised Order Granting Summary Judgment, which disposed of all of Bodell
Construction Company's ("Bodell Construction") claims against all remaining parties.
That same day a docket entry was made by the District Court indicating that "Case
Disposition is Judgment." (Addendum ("Add.") at 57.)1 Bodell Construction filed a
timely notice of appeal on November 30, 2007. The Utah Supreme Court transferred the
appeal to this Court in an order dated December 7, 2007.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the District Court erred in ruling that a settlement agreement

between Bodell Construction and a non-party to the current lawsuit was an accord and
satisfaction, as a matter of law, rather than a release. Standard of Review: If a trial court
interprets a contract as a matter of law, as the District Court did in this case, the decision
is reviewed for correctness, giving the trial court's interpretation no deference. Peterson
v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, ^ 14, 48 P.3d 918.
2.

Whether the District Court erred in ruling that the same settlement

agreement is unambiguous and not susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation. Standard of Review: A trial court's determination that an agreement is

For the* Court's convenience, a copy of the District Court's electronic docket is included
in the Addendum at pages 29-59.
1

unambiguous is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. See Winegar v.
Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991).
3.

Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment for

Appellees despite genuine disputes of material fact regarding the intended meaning of the
settlement agreement. Standard of Review: The grant of summary judgment is reviewed
for correctness, granting no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Green River
Canal v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, % 16, 84 P.3d 1134. In doing so, this Court must "view the
facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable" to
Appellant, the non-moving party. Surety Underwriters v. E&C Trucking, Inc., 2000 UT
71,f 15, 10P.3d338.
4.

Whether the District Court erred when it ruled that the doctrine of accord

and satisfaction bars Bodell Construction's tort claims against Appellees even though
Appellees were not parties to the settlement agreement and are not referenced in the
agreement. Standard of Review: The District Court's ruling regarding the scope of
accord and satisfaction, which was derived from within the four comers of a settlement
agreement, is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. Peterson v. Sunrider
Corp., 2002 UT 43, f 14, 48 P.3d 918.
5.

Whether the District Court erred in striking the Expert R.eport of Merrill

Weight, Bodell Construction's damages expert. Standard of Review: The District
Court's ruling regarding the interpretation of the governing Rules of Civil Procedure, in
this case Rules 26 and 37, is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. Pete v.

2

Youngblood, 2006 UT App. 303, lj 7, 141 P.3d 629, 632. The correctness of the remedy
the Court imposed is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See id.
STATEMENT OF PRESERVATION OF ISSUES FOR APPEAL
These issues were preserved for appeal because Bodell Construction opposed the
Appellees' motions for summary judgment as well as Appellees' Motion to Exclude
Expert Testimony of Merrill Weight. [R. 49-63, 2413-2535, 2744-2849, 3390-3403,
3489-4029, 4038-4533]
DETERMINATIVE OR CENTRALLY IMPORTANT
PROVISIONS OF LAW
The primary legal issue in this appeal is governed by the Liability Reform Act,
U.C.A. § 78-27-42, which provides that "A release given by a person seeking recovery to
one or more defendants does not discharge any other defendant unless the release so
provides."
Rules 26 and 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah Code Ann. § 15-11 are also centrally important to the issue of whether the District Court error in striking
Appellant's damages expert. These rules are included in the Addendum at pages 14-28,
60.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Plaintiff Bodell Construction filed the complaint in this matter on July 31,

2003. [R. 1-20] The complaint named Appellees as defendants, along with Cherokee &

3

Walker Investment Company and Cherokee & Walker, L.L.C. [Id.] The case was
initially assigned to Judge William Bohling.
2.

On October 29, 2003, Defendant/Appellee Bank One moved for summary

judgment arguing that the doctrine of accord and satisfaction barred Bodell
Construction's claims. [R. 34-36] Defendant/Appellee Mark Robbins joined the motion.
[R. 309-310]
3.

On March 15, 2004, after full briefing and oral argument, Judge Bohling

entered an order denying Bank One's Motion for Summary Judgment. [R. 316-20] In
the order, Judge Bohling stated:
The Court is persuaded that at issue is a liquidated debt for which less than
the outstanding balance was accepted in the settlement agreement with the
Jenson parties. Accordingly, no 'accord and satisfaction' was reached
between Plaintiff Bodell on the one hand and the Jenson parties on the
other. The Court is further not persuaded that an accord and satisfaction
operates for the benefit of third parties unless said third parties are
specifically referenced in the agreement.
[R. 317]
4.

Following Judge Bohling's ruling, the parties engaged in lengthy and

expensive discovery. During this discovery period, the case was reassigned to Judge
Kennedy.
5.

Bodell Construction filed its First Amended Complaint on September 19,

2006. [R. 2219-2242] The First Amended Complaint included clams for common law

The Cherokee & Walker parties later settled the claims against them and are not parties
to this appeal.
4

fraud against both Appellees, for civil conspiracy and unjust enrichment against Robbins,
and for negligent misrepresentation against Bank One. (Id.)
6.

Following fact discovery, the parties engaged in expert discovery. On June

11, 2007, nearly four months before the scheduled trial in this matter, Bodell
Construction timely produced the expert report of Merrill Weight, which mathematically
calculated different damage scenarios. All of the scenarios relied upon established Utah
case law regarding potential damages and relied primarily on facts that had been
exhaustively examined during fact discovery. Both Bank One and Robbins moved to
strike the expert report because they claimed that the damages theories contained therein
had not been adequately disclosed during fact discovery. [R. 2865-2873, 3365-3367]
Judge Kennedy granted the motions and struck Mr. Weight's expert report in an order
dated August 22, 2007. [R. 4766-4769]
7.

At the conclusion of discovery, Bank One and Robbins again moved for

summary judgment. Among other arguments, Bank One and Robbins renewed their
arguments regarding accord and satisfaction, asking Judge Kennedy to reconsider Judge
Bohling's earlier ruling that accord and satisfaction did not bar Appellant's claims. [R.
2589-2743; 3035-3222]
8.

At a hearing on September 10, 2007, just weeks before the trial of this

matter was scheduled to begin, Judge Kennedy asked for briefing regarding the issue of
whether the District Court had authority to revisit Judge Bohling's earlier ruling and, if it
did, whether the court should do so. [R. 6256, pg. 61] Following briefing on this issue,
Judge Kennedy reversed Judge Bohling's earlier ruling and granted summary judgment
5

against Appellant on the ground that accord and satisfaction barred all of Appellant's
claims. [R. 6020-6025]
9.

On November 5, 2007, the District Court signed a Revised Order Granting

Summary Judgment. [R. 6020-6025] That same day a docket entry was made by the
District Court indicating that "Case Disposition is Judgment." (Add. 57.) Bodell
Construction filed a timely notice of appeal on November 30, 2007. [R. 6226-6228]
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3
In early 2000, Appellee Mark Robbins ("Robbins") sold 50 percent of his bicycle
operation to Cherokee & Walker ("C&W"), a private equity firm, in exchange for a $4.5
million personal loan and a $500,000 capital contribution in the bicycle companies
(collectively "Vtrax"). [R. 4058] However, the new business relationship was strained
almost immediately because Robbins failed to provide information to C&W about the
operation of Vtrax and made important business decisions without the knowledge or
consent of C&W. [R. 4059, 4356-4360] Only weeks after entering into their joint
venture, both C&W and Robbins wanted out. [R. 4060, 4363] By early May 2000, the
parties had an agreement providing that Robbins would repurchase C&W's interest in
Vtrax and repay the personal loan by making a total payment of $8 million. [R. 4367,
4637-4643] However, Robbins did not have the $8 million that he had promised to pay
C&W. [R. 4626-4629, 4645, 4647, 4649] Over the next several months, Robbins
continuously missed payment deadline after payment deadline to C&W. [R. 3524-28]

A more detailed statement of facts is included in Bodell Construction's Opposition to
Bank One's Motion for Summary Judgment. [R. 4058-4095]
6

C&W became increasingly impatient and aggressive with Robbins in an attempt to
recover its investment before Ytrax collapsed. [R. 4&2S]
As C&W was attempting to negotiate a buyout, Vtrax was falling apart because it
was dramatically under-capitalized and Robbins had high expenses due in part to paying
inflated salaries. [R. 4651, 4039] Because of its financial condition, Vtrax was unable
even to perform on any purchase orders it received for bicycles. [R. 4627]
puring the same period, Robbins learned that Brunswick Corporation was
auctioning its bicycle division, together with its popular "Mongoose" brand. [R. 4177]
Robbins developed a plan to try to acquire Mongoose. [R. 4039-4040] He created a new
"group" to pursue the acquisition of Mongoose without the "knowledge of C&W. [Id.]
Robbins needed to maintain control of his bicycle company in order to be a legitimate
candidate in the Mongoose auction. [R. 4382-4383] For this reason, he could not afford
to have C&W seize control of his bicycle companies for failure of payment. [R. 4383]
He also wanted to buyout C&W so that, in the unlikely event he was the successful
bidder for Mongoose, he would not have to share the returns from his new acquisition.
[R. 4040]
By early August, C&W had retained attorneys and set in motion the legal process
to seize control of Vtrax under the terms of the initial lending agreements. [R. 46584659] Desperate to get $8 million to payoff C&W and get them out of the picture,
Robbins approached Marc Jenson, who owned and operated a hard money lending
business named MSF Properties. [R. 4204,4381] Robbins told Jenson about his need to
raise $8 million to payoff his partners. [R. 4206-4208, 4381-4382] Robbins explained
7

that he was bidding for Mongoose and had already lined-up several sources for
substantial, permanent lending. [R. 4391] Robbins also showed Jenson financial
statements for Vtrax in support of representations that Vtrax had considerable value. [R.
4385-88]
Jenson ultimately agreed to lend Robbins $8 million for the buyout of C&W. [R.
4381] Jenson planned from the beginning to fund the $8 million with $4 million he was
receiving in an unrelated transaction and $4 million coming from Appellant, Bodell
Construction. [R. 4392-4393, 4399] Jenson specifically told Robbins he planned to
approach Mike Bodell, a significant owner of Bodell Construction, to obtain the other $4
million. [R. 4393-4394] Jenson had a relationship with Mr. Bodell and had recently
secured an unrelated $1 million loan from Bodell Construction for Jenson's hard money
lending business. [R. 4395-4398]
As discussed with Robbins, Jenson met with Mr. Bodell of Bodell Construction
and solicited $4 million. [R. 4399, 4068] Jenson shared with Mr. Bodell all that Robbins
had told Jenson, including the financial statements from Robbins. [R. 4400-4402]
Jenson told Mr. Bodell the timing was critical and that the deal had to be done quickly to
keep C&W from participating in the Mongoose acquisition. [R. 4323] Bodell
Construction was still considering whether or not to make the loan when Jenson sent
Robbins a commitment letter on August 9, 2000 for the $8 million loan. [R. 4660-4661]
The letter called for funding the $8 million on or before August 15. [R. 4660] Robbins
immediately notified C&W that he had funding in place to get them paid and said he
would settle on August 15. [R. 4671]
8

Bodell Construction was undecided whether or not to make the loan to Jenson
because of, among other things, the size of the loan. [R. 4330] Without a commitment
from Bodell Construction, Jenson was unable to fund the $8 million loan to Robbins by
August 15, and Robbins defaulted for the seventh time on a promised payment to C&W.
[R. 4343-4347, 4677] With the pressure from C&W bearing down, Robbins approached
Benjamin Lightner, his private banker at Bank One, and requested a letter representing
that $165 million would be deposited into Bank One for Robbins and Jenson to manage.
[R. 4071-4074, 4194-4195] A copy of this letter is included in the Addendum at 61.
Robbins dictated for Lightner the information he needed in the letter. [R. 4213] Lightner
and Bank One issued the letter requested by Robbins on August 22, 2000. [R. 4673] The
letter contained numerous statements Robbins and Bank One knew to be false when they
wrote the letter. [R. 4072, 4299] The letter also omits a number of facts that would be
highly material to a party considering whether or not to make a loan based on the
representations in the letter. [R. 4074, 4300]
As planned, Robbins gave the letter to Jenson for the purpose of his showing it to
Bodell Construction and convincing it that there was a confirmed source of repayment of
the $4 million Robbins and Jenson needed from Bodell Construction for Robbins to
payoff C&W. [R. 4407, 4409-4410] Jenson then showed the letter to Bodell
Construction. [R. 4406] Based on the Bank One letter, Bodell Construction finally
agreed to make the loan provided Jenson agree to a higher interest rate than Jenson had
originally proposed. [R. 4336, 4403]

9

Eight days after Bank One issued the letter, Bodell Construction funded a $4
million loan to Jenson, who in turn funded his $8 million loan to Robbins. [R. 46794684] Robbins paid C&W and obtained full control of Vtrax. [R. 4686, 4688] However,
Robbins' bid effort to acquire Mongoose, failed less than two months later. [R. 3506]
Vtrax collapsed, having never sold a single bicycle, having generated not one dollar in
revenue, and with hefty debts. [R. 4226-4227, 4081] Robbins defaulted on his
repayment obligation to Jenson, and Jenson in turn defaulted on his repayment obligation
to Bodell Construction. [R. 3052, 3521] Moreover, there was no $165 million
investment/loan. [R. 3535]
On March 18, 2003, Bodell Construction, Mike Bodell, MSF Properties, and Mark
Jenson executed a settlement agreement (the "Settlement Agreement"). [Add. 01-03]
The Settlement Agreement included a release of MSF Properties and Jenson that read, in
part, as follows:
2.
Each of Bodell and BCC [Bodell Construction Company], for
himself, itself, their affiliates and for all persons or entities claiming by,
through or under him, it or them, hereby (a) releases, acquits, waives and
forever discharges MSF, its affiliates and their respective members,
managers, officers, employees and agents (each, including without
limitation Jenson, an "MSF Party") from any and all claims, allegations of
fraud, charges, demands, losses, damages, obligations, liabilities,
grievances, causes of action, or suits at law and equity of whatsoever kind
and nature, expenses, costs and attorney fees, whether known or unknown,
suspected or unsuspected, liquidated or unliquidated (each, a "Claim"),
arising out of all past affiliations and transactions among Bodell, BCC and
any MSF Party, including, but not limited to, the Loans and all related
arrangements and transactions, (b) without limiting the generality of the
foregoing, acknowledges and agrees that the obligations of the MSF
Parties in connection with the Loans, including all principal and interest
that may have been deemed to have accrued thereon, are hereby deemed
fully satisfied and repaid in full; provided that such releases shall not
10

apply to any obligation of MSF or Jenson set forth in this Agreement to
be performed or observed after the execution and delivery hereof.

5.
Each of the parties hereto understand and agree that this is a mutual
release of claims and that, following the execution of this document, no
Bodell Party shall have any claim against an MSF Party and no MSF Party
shall have any claim against a Bodell Party, except with respect MSF's
requirement to pay BCC $3 million as set forth herein.
(Emphasis added.) A copy of the Settlement Agreement is included in the addendum
hereto at pages 01-03.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court's ruling in this matter disregards the law of settlement in Utah and,
if allowed, would upset settled expectations and understandings of numerous litigants. In
1994, the Utah Legislature passed the Liability Reform Act, adopting a policy that only
parties listed in a settlement agreement are released from liability. The District Court's
contrary interpretation of the common-law doctrine of accord and satisfaction ignores this
legislative pronouncement and, if allowed to stand, would muddle the doctrine of release
and discourage settlement.
The District Court erred in granting summary judgment for Appellees and in
making several predicate legal conclusions. Specifically, the District Court erred by
finding that the Settlement Agreement constituted an accord and satisfaction on its face
even though the agreement is repeatedly characterized as a release, the term "accord and
satisfaction" is never used, and the agreement clearly states that it only applies to MSF
properties and Jenson and is not intended to benefit Appellees. The District Court also
erred in granting summary judgment and ignoring genuine issues of fact regarding the
11

appropriate interpretation of the Settlement Agreement. Appellant introduced evidence
through deposition and affidavit indicating that Mr. Bodell did not intend to release any
claims against Appellees, which created a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly,
summary judgment was inappropriate. Finally, the District Court erred by finding that an
accord and satisfaction could benefit a non-party to the settlement agreement, who had no
privity of interest with the parties, even though there is no indication that the parties
intended to do so. This conclusion is contrary to Utah law, which requires a clear
expression of intent to benefit a non-party to a release or an accord and satisfaction.
In addition, the District Court also erred in striking the expert report of Appellant's
damages expert, Merrill Weight on the ground that the damages theories had not been
timely disclosed. However, the District Court's order was improper because Appellant
did not violate any court order or Rule of Civil Procedure. And, even if Appellant did
violate a rule, the error was harmless because the report was produced four months in
advance of trial. The draconian sanction of striking the report was an abuse of discretion.
ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred in Holding that Bodell Construction's Tort Claims
Against Non-Parties to the Settlement Agreement Are Barred, as a Matter of
Law, by the Doctrine of Accord and Satisfaction
Reversing Judge Bohling's original order, the District Court concluded that the

Settlement Agreement constitutes an accord and satisfaction that operates for the benefit
of third parties, in this case Appellees, who are not parties to the Settlement Agreement,
and are not even mentioned. See Revised Order Granting Summary Judgment at 3-4,
Add. 08-12. In reaching this conclusion, the District Court relied exclusively on its
12

interpretation of the language of the Settlement Agreement itself, finding that "the
existence of an accord and satisfaction is shown within the four corners of the Settlement
Agreement." (Id.) Both conclusions are erroneous. The plain language of the Settlement
Agreement clearly shows that the parties did not intend to create an accord and
satisfaction or otherwise preclude tort claims against non-parties to the agreement. At the
very least, there are genuine disputes of material fact regarding the intended meaning of
the Settlement Agreement that preclude summary judgment. Moreover, even if the
Settlement Agreement constituted an accord and satisfaction, there is simply no Utah
authority that supports the notion that the accord and satisfaction would bar claims
against non-parties to the agreement absent a clear intention to do so. To the contrary,
the Liability Reform Act provides that parties who are not specifically named in a release
do not benefit from it. The nebulous common law doctrine of accord and satisfaction
should not be used to circumvent the clearly-stated intent of the legislature or the
expectations of the parties.
A.

The District Court Erred in Ruling that an Accord and Satisfaction is
Shown Within the Four Corners of the Settlement Agreement

The District Court found that "the existence of an accord and satisfaction is shown
with the cfour comers' of the Settlement Agreement." [ Id. at 3.] In fact, the text of the
Settlement Agreement shows that the parties intended to create a release limited to the
signatories to the agreement and did not intend to create an accord and satisfaction that
would bar tort claims against non-parties to the agreement.

13

Paragraph 2 of the Settlement Agreement contains the language upon which the
District Court apparently relied in finding an accord and satisfaction. The relevant
language provides:
Each of Bodell and BCC [Bodell Construction Company], for himself,
itself, their affiliates and for all persons or entities claiming by, through or
under him, it or them, hereby (a) releases, acquits, waives and forever
discharges MSF, its affiliates and their respective members, managers,
officers, employees and agents (each, including without limitation Jenson,
an "MSF Party") from any and all claims, allegations of fraud, charges,
demands, losses, damages, obligations, liabilities, grievances, causes of
action, or suits at law and equity of whatsoever kind and nature, expenses,
costs and attorney fees, whether known or unknown, suspected or
unsuspected, liquidated or unliquidated (each, a "Claim"), arising out of all
past affiliations and transactions among Bodell, BCC and any MSF Party,
including, but not limited to, the Loans and all related arrangements and
transactions, (b) without limiting the generality of the foregoing,
acknowledges and agrees that the obligations of the MSF Parties in
connection with the Loans, including all principal and interest that may
have been deemed to have accrued thereon, are hereby deemed fully
satisfied and repaid in full; provided that such releases shall not apply to
any obligation of MSF or Jenson set forth in this Agreement to be
performed or observed after the execution and delivery hereof (Emphasis
added.)
Several provisions of the Settlement Agreement show that the parties did not
intend to create an accord and satisfaction that would bar tort claims against non-parties
to the agreement. First, the Settlement Agreement indicates that it only applies to the
parties. Specifically, the fourth "WHEREAS clause" in the Settlement Agreement
indicates that "the parties now desire to achieve a fxxll settlement of all obligations,
disputes and other matters outstanding between them ..." (emphasis added.) [Add. 1] In
subparagraph (a) of the release, the Settlement Agreement then defines its application
only to MSF Parties, a terms that is defined to mean "MSF, its affiliates and their
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respective members, managers, officers, employees, and agents (each, including without
limitation Jenson, an "MSF Party")." In subparagraph (b), which Appellees contend
creates an accord and satisfaction, the release is again limited to "the obligations of the
MSF parties." The Settlement Agreement never mentions any parties other than the
signatories to the agreement, and is entirely silent regarding both Bank One and Robbins,
thereby excluding any possible intention to benefit non-parties to the agreement.
Second, the Settlement Agreement explicitly applies to both "liquidated and
unliquidated" claims. Utah law is clear that an accord and satisfaction only applies if the
amount owing is unliquidated or subject to a bona fide dispute. ProMax Dev. Corp. v.
Raille, 998 P.2d 254, 259; 2000 Utah 4, U 20 (2000). Given that the Settlement
Agreement applies to both liquidated and unliquidated claims, it cannot be an accord and
satisfaction.
Third, the Settlement Agreement characterizes both subparagraphs (a) and (b) as
releases, and nowhere describes or suggests that subparagraph (b) as an accord and
satisfaction. Subparagraph (a) indicates that it is a release of the MSF Parties, and
Appellees have previously conceded as much. [R. 42] However, Appellees argued
below that subparagraph (b) must be an accord and satisfaction because it would
otherwise be redundant of subparagraph (a).5 [Id.] This argument completely ignores the

4

In any event, the amount owed was liquidated and there was no dispute over the
amount due. The amount owing was simply a mathematical calculation of the principal
plus accrued interest. The only question was Jenson's ability to pay.
5
This argument not only ignores the plain language of the Settlement Agreement, it also
ignores the realities of legal practice. Attorneys often include release provisions in
settlement agreements that are partially redundant in an effort to ensure that a client has
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language that follows both subparagraph (a) and (b), which describes both provisions as
releases. That language, in bold in the quote above, specifically provides that "such
releases shall not apply to any obligation of MSF or Jenson set forth in this Agreement to
be performed or observed after the execution and delivery thereof." (Emphasis added)
The fact that the Settlement Agreement uses the plural term "releases" instead of the
singular term "release" shows that the drafters of the agreement considered both
subparagraph (a) and (b) to be releases. Had the drafters intended that only subparagraph
(a) constitute a release, they would have used the singular term "release." This
interpretation is confirmed by the fact that the Settlement Agreement never uses the term
accord and satisfaction.
If this were not evidence enough that the drafters intended the Settlement
Agreement to be a release, the parties added another paragraph to make it absolutely
clear. Paragraph 5 of the Settlement Agreement provides:
Each of the parties hereto understand and agree that this is a mutual release
of claims and that, following execution of this document, no Bodell Party
shall have a claim against an MSF Party and no MSF Party shall have a
claim against a Bodell Party, except with respect [to] MSF's requirement to
pay [Bodell Construction] $3 million as set forth herein. (Emphasis added)
Because the Settlement Agreement is a release of the MSF Parties only and neither
Bank One nor Robbins is mentioned in the a^eement, Utah law is clear that Appellees
are not released. Appellees' claim that the language of the Settlement Agreement which
released MSF and Jenson from further liability on the loans also releases them from

as much protection as possible.
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Bodell Construction's misrepresentation claims is governed by the Utah Liability Reform
Act. That act provide, in relevant part:
A release given by a person seeking recovery to one or more defendants does not
discharge any other defendant unless the release so provides.
U.C.A. § 78-27-42 (emphasis added).6 Thus, for Appellees to be released by the
Settlement Agreement the agreement must explicitly provide as much, which it does not.
In Child v. Newsome, 892 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah 1995), the Utah Supreme Court
explained the purpose for the enactment of the Liability Reform Act as follows:
Section 78-27-42 was enacted to repeal Section 15-4-4 of the Joint Obligations
Act, which had codified the common law rule that a release of one tort-feasor also
released all other tort-feasors. The statute was designed to retain the liability of
tort-feasors and reverse the common law rule "so that release of one joint tortfeasor did not automatically release all tort-feasors." (Citations Omitted)
The Liability Reform Act requires that a release "must contain language either
naming the defendant or identifying the defendant with some degree of specificity in
order to discharge that defendant from liability." Child, 892 P.2d at 12. See also Nelson
v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop, 935 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah 1997).
For example, in Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339 (Utah 1996), the plaintiffs
commenced suit against various persons and entities claimed to be liable for damage to
the Salt Lake Athletic Club building. When the damage was originally discovered, the
contractor who had allegedly caused the damage paid for limited repairs and received a
release which discharged the contractor "and all persons and entities" from any liability

6

In turn, Utah Code Annotated, § 78-27-37(1), defines a defendant as "A person...who
is claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking recovery." This definition
covers both Appellees.
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from damage to the building. The defendants claimed that because the release discharged
"all persons and entities" they were released from any liability for the damage. The Utah
Supreme Court rejected this contention and held that the release did not cover the
defendants, writing:
In Child v. Newsome,.. .[\v] e found that the statute [78-27-42] was enacted to
discard the common law rule that a release of one tort-feasor would release all
tort-feasors and concluded that releases "must contain language either naming the
defendant or identifying the defendant with some degree of specificity in order to
discharge that defendant from liability." ...

Holding that the ... [defendants] are discharged by the release would "direct[ly]
oppos[e] ... the very statute that was enacted to prevent this from occurring."
See also Thornock v. Jensen, 950 P.2d 441, 443-44 (Utah App. 1997) (holding that
agreement releasing "heirs" did not name defendant with sufficient specificity to release
her under statute).
In this case, the Settlement Agreement's release of MSF and Jenson is completely
silent regarding Robbins and Bank One. Thus, the release of MSF and Jenson from
liability on the loans and any tort claims does not release Robbins or Bank One from
liability for tort claims based on their actions in wrongfully inducing Bodell Construction
to make the August 30 loan.
Although Bodell Construction submits that the language of the Settlement
Agreement makes it clear that the agreement only intended to release MSF, the burden is
on Appellees to show a clear release of the claims against them in the Settlement
Agreement. If one reasonable interpretation of the Settlement Agreement is that it
18

created a release for the benefit of MSF and Jenson but did not create release or an accord
and satisfaction for Appellees', then the Settlement Agreement cannot be interpreted as a
matter of law, the entry of summary judgment was improper, and the judgment must be
reversed. See WebBankv. American General Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, \ 22, 54
P.3d 1139, 1145 ("When ambiguity exists, the intent of the parties becomes a question of
fact").
B.

The District Court Erred in Finding That the Settlement Agreement is
Unambiguous Because, at the Very Least, Genuine Disputes of
Material Fact Exist Regarding the Intended Meaning of the Settlement
Agreement

At the very least, there were genuine issues of material fact regarding the
interpretation of the Settlement Agreement that made the grant of summary judgment
improper. Summary judgment may be granted only if the "pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The affidavits and
depositions provided here clearly created a dispute of material fact regarding the meaning
of the Settlement Agreement, and those disputed issues of material fact make the grant of
summary judgment improper.
Bodell Construction submitted the Affidavit of Michael Bodell in support of its
opposition to Bank One's Motion for Summary Judgment. That affidavit provided that
"[i]n negotiating the settlement and signing the Settlement Agreement, Bodell
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Construction did not intend to release any claims it had against Bank One." [R. 66]
Mr. Bodell's testimony creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding the meaning and
intent of the Settlement Agreement, especially when considered in conjunction with the
plain language of the Settlement Agreement — which applies only to the MSF Parties,
does not mention Bank One or Robbins, describes the relevant provisions as releases, and
never uses the term "accord and satisfaction." Because a genuine issue of material fact
existed regarding the intended meaning of the Settlement Agreement, the District Court
erred in granting summary judgment.
C.

The District Court Erred in Ruling that Accord and Satisfaction Bars
Tort Claims Against Non-Parties to the Settlement Agreement

Even if the Settlement Agreement was an accord and satisfaction, the accord and
satisfaction would not bar tort claims against non-parties to the agreement because the
parties to the Settlement Agreement did not intend that Appellees should benefit from the
agreement. Bank One and Robbins may not seek protection under the Settlement
Agreement without showing that intent. The Utah Supreme Court has discussed this
requirement as follows:
To effect an accord and satisfaction, payment must result from declarations of
such a clear nature as to assure that the parties are aware of the extent and scope of
such agreement. When two claims based on different types of transactions are
involved, settlement of one does not result in an accord and satisfaction of the
other claim without a clear expression of the parties evidencing such an intent.
Messickv. PHD Trucking Service, Inc., 615 P.2d 1276, 1277-78 (Utah 1980).

7

This testimony was reaffirmed by Mr. Bodell during his deposition. However, because
the issue of accord and satisfaction had already been ruled upon by Judge Bohling before
Mr. Bodell's deposition, that evidence was never entered into the record.
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The Settlement Agreement does not show a "clear expression of the parties
evidencing such an intent." Indeed, as discussed above, the Settlement Agreement does
not mention either Robbins or Bank One or refer to them in any way. If the actual parties
to the Settlement Agreement had truly intended to release all claims against Appellees,
one would expect to see them mentioned.
Absent a clear intent to release Appellees, Utah case law is clear that a non-party
to the agreement cannot benefit from an accord and satisfaction. For example, in Killian
v. Oberhansly, the Utah Supreme Court considered whether one partner's payment of
partnership debts to a third party could constitute an accord and satisfaction of that
partner's debts to the partnership itself. See 143 P.2d 1200, 1201 (Utah 1987). The
Court found no accord and satisfaction as to the partnership debts, because it could find
no evidence that the parties intended it to be so. See id. ("Nowhere in the record . . . is
there any indication that an agreement to pay the partnership debts to third parties was
intended to settle the accounts between the partners.").
Similarly, in Messick v. PHD Trucking Service, Inc., the defendant claimed that an
agreement to sell his truck to the plaintiff constituted an accord and satisfaction as to the
defendant's other debts to the plaintiff. 615 P.2d at 1277-78. The Utah Supreme Court
overturned the lower court's finding of an accord and satisfaction, reasoning that it could
find no evidence that the parties intended their agreement to satisfy all claims against the
defendant. Id. ("The record reveals no expression of an intent to discharge rights or
obligations involving the lease and operation of the truck.")
This focus on the parties' intentions is uniformly maintained by courts in other
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jurisdictions as well. See, e.g., Fleet Mortg. Corp. v. Schuster, 811 P.2d 81, 82-83 (N.M.
1991) (finding that plaintiff could not sue to enforce accord to which she was not a party
or intended beneficiary); Luxenburg v. Can-Tex Indus., 257 N.W. 2d 804, 807-08 (Minn.
1977) (denying third-parties' request to find that claims against them had been satisfied
by plaintiffs settlement with one tortfeasor, by considering "the intention of the parties to
the release agreement."); see also 1 Am. Jur. 2d Accord and Satisfaction § 11 ("if an
injured party receives a part of damages from one co-tortfeasor, and receipt of that part is
not understood to constitute a full satisfaction of the injury, the injured party does not
thereby discharge the others from liability.").
One test of whether the parties to an agreement intended an accord and satisfaction
to release claims against a certain person is simply to inquire whether the person who
claims to have been released was made a party to the agreement. See, e.g., Dillman v.
Foster, 656 P.2d 974, 980 (Utah 1983) (affirming lower court's ruling that agreement did
not constitute accord and satisfaction in favor of obligor because obligor was not party to
the agreement); Fleet Mortg. Corp., 811 P.2d at 82-83 (same). Applying that
straightforward test here, there can be no doubt that Bodell and Jenson did not intend
o

their agreement to have any impact on Appellees' liability.

A second test is suggested in Loh v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 422 A.2d 16, 26 (Md. Ct.
App. 1980). In Loh, a Maryland Court of Appeals conducted extensive analysis of the
difference between an accord and satisfaction that applies to all obligors, and one which
releases only the parties thereto. Construing a statute similar to Utah's Liability Reform
Act, the Court concluded that where the plaintiff enters a release after obtaining
judgment, that release applies to all co-tortfeasors, as liability is admitted by the
defendants who execute such an agreement. On the other hand, a release entered prior to
judgment, where no admission or presumption of liability is made, binds only those who
22

D.

It Would Be Fundamentally Unfair to Dismiss Bodell Construction's
Claims On the Basis of Accord and Satisfaction, an Ambiguous
Common Law Concept that Was Arguably Supplanted by Statutory
Law

Accord and satisfaction is a common law doctrine that governs settlements. See
Am. Jur. 2d, Accord and Satisfaction § 1 (2005) ("An accord and satisfaction is a method
of discharging a contract or a claim or a cause of action whereby the parties agree to give
and accept something other than that which is due in settlement of the claim and to
perform the agreement.") Release is a similar doctrine that, unlike accord and
satisfaction, does not require consideration. The distinction between accord and
satisfaction on the one hand and release on the other hand is not always clear and courts
have not often been adequately rigorous in their consideration of the two doctrines. This
may be due in part to the fact that the application of either doctrine will often produce the
same result.
Under the common law, "an accord and satisfaction between a person injured and
one of several cotortfeasors responsible for the injury will discharge the other tortfeasors
from further liability to the person injured." Am. Jur 2d, Accord and Satisfaction, § 11
(2005).9 The Utah Liability Reform Act reversed the common law rule. See Child, 892
P.2d at 11 (explaining that the purpose of this section of the Act was to reverse the
common-law rule that a release of one tort-feasor also released all other tort-feasors).

enter that agreement. See id. Under this analysis, the Settlement Agreement, which
Bodell Construction entered with MSF Properties long before any judgment was rendered
in this case, cannot benefit Robbins or Bank One.
9
However, even this general does not apply if, as in this case, receipt of partial payment
"is not understood to constitute a full satisfaction of the injury." {Id.)
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Indeed, given that the doctrines of release and of accord and satisfaction significantly
overlap, the Liability Reform Act appears to have been intended to alter the common law
rules relating to accord and satisfaction. The law encourages settlements and the
Liability Reform Act was enacted to avoid the potential pitfalls in the doctrine of accord
and satisfaction that would discourage settlement. It would be perverse and unfair to now
allow Appellees to achieve the very result the legislature sought to avoid by enacting the
Liability Reform Act.
Since the Liability Reform Act was enacted in 1994, litigants have relied on it in
settling claims. Given that the parties to the Settlement Agreement repeatedly
characterized the agreement as a "mutual release/' it was reasonable for Bodell
Construction to also conclude that U.C.A. § 78-27-42 eliminated the need for it to reserve
expressly claims against parties such as Appellees. Given that the doctrines of release
and accord and satisfaction have significant overlap, it would be unfair to upset the
parties' expectations and apply an arcane common law rule that contravenes statutory law
and that would allow Appellees to escape liability based on a settlement with a different
defendant where they were not mentioned and where the amount obtained by Plaintiff
was less than the claimed loss.
II.

The District Court Erred in Striking the Exoert Renort of Aooellant's
Damages Expert
On June 11, 2007, more than four months in advance of trial, Bodell Construction

produced the expert report of Merrill Weight, Bodell Construction's Secretary and
Treasurer (hereinafter referred to as the "Weight Report"), which calculated potential
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damages in this matter. The Weight Report employed three different damages models:
(1) benefit of the bargain damages, which applied the contractual rate of interest through
October 22, 2007 (the first day of the scheduled trial); (2) a modified benefit-of-thebargain theory that applied the contractual rate of interest on the unpaid amount until
October 3, 2000 (the expected term of the loan) and then applied a statutory rate through
the date of trial; and (3) a comparable rate of return analysis that applied the interest rate
that Bodell Construction would have earned on other loans that it could have made were
it not fraudulently induced to make the loan to MSF Properties and Jenson.10
Mr. Weight had already been deposed by Defendants during fact discovery and
was available to be deposed a second time during the expert discovery period.
Mr. Weight's report did not set forth some new, unexpected theories on damages^ To the
contrary, it applied long-established theories that were well-known and are generally
accepted for fraud claims. Rather than hire an expert of their own, Defendants moved to
strike Mr. Weight's expert report claiming that Bodell Construction had not adequately
disclosed these damages theories in its initial disclosures and discovery responses. Even
though Defendants still had ample time to conduct discovery regarding these wellestablished damages theories, and Bodell Construction committed to provide them with
broad leeway in doing so, the District Court granted the motion to strike the Weight
Report on the ground that "these claims and the bases for them were not disclosed during
fact discovery and defendants are now unable to conduct fact discovery to rebut those

A copy of the Weight Report is included in the record at pages 2992-3018.
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theories." (R. 4767) The District Court's order limited Appellant to the outstanding loan
balance plus interest at the rate of 10 percent per annum. (Id.)11
The District Court's order was improper and should be reversed for several
reasons. First, Bodell Construction did not violate any court order and complied with the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Second, Bodell Construction's conduct - producing a
detailed damages calculation based on generally accepted theories - is the manner in
which most expert discovery is performed. Therefore, even if Bodell Construction
violated Rule 26, there was good cause for the practice. Third, any failure was harmless.
Given that more than four months remained before trial, the District Court should have
imposed a less-draconian sanction and abused its discretion in excluding the Weight
Report.
A.

The District Court's Ruling Should Be Reversed Because Bodell
Construction Did Not Violate Any Court Order and Complied With
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

Interpretation of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is a question of law that this
Court reviews for correctness. Pete, 2006 UT App. 303, ^ 7, 141 P.3d 629, 632. It is
axiomatic that no sanctions can be imposed on a party if the party did not violate a court
order or an applicable rule.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(C) requires that a party make initial
disclosures, including "a computation of any category of damages claimed by the
disclosing party." Bodell Construction served initial disclosures that provided that

A copy of the Court's order is included in the Addendum at pages 4-7.
26

"Bodell's damages constitute the funds advanced, together with interest at the
legal rate, less the payment received from MSF. The precise calculations have not
yet been completed. Bodell will make available for inspection [and] copying all
discoverable documents or other evidentiary material on which a computation is
based."
[R. 2895] This response complied with the requirements of Rule 26(a)(1)(C) and neither
Appellee objected to this disclosure.
Subsequently, during the fact discovery period, Bodell Construction provided
discovery responses indicating that it was seeking interest "at the legal rate." [R. 287678] In response to a specific request for admission from Bank One, Bodell then clarified
that it interpreted the legal rate to mean "the rate provided in Utah Code §§ 15-1-1 and
15-1-4." [R.2962]
Section 15-1-1(1) is clear that "the parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any
rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action that is
the subject of their contract." There is no dispute that the contract between Bodell
Construction and MSF Properties was lawful. Therefore, Bodell Construction adequately
disclosed that it intended to seek damages at the rate specified in the contract.
Appellees apparently believe that the legal rate is the rate contained in Section 151-1(2). However, Appellees did not ask and Bodell Construction did not specify that it
intended to calculate damages using the 10 percent rate set forth in subsection (2).
Moreover, even if subsection (2) applies, that section explicitly provides that a 10 percent
rate applies "[u]nless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest...."
That is exactly what happened here. MSF Properties and Bodell Construction agreed to a
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different rate that would govern their relationship and should govern damages in this
case.
Because both subsections (1) and (2) of Section 15-1-1 provide that the legal rate
may be the rate agreed to by the parties to a lawful contract, Bodell Construction's
disclosure and discovery responses provided Appellees sufficient notice of Bodell Const
Moreover, even if the responses were materially incomplete or incorrect, sanctions
may only be imposed if the supplementation was not provided "seasonably." See Utah R.
Civ. P. 26(e)(2). Bodell Construction provided the Weight Report in compliance with the
District Court's scheduling order and more than four months in advance of trial. This
production was seasonable under the circumstances.
B.

Even If Bodell Construction Did Not Properly Disclose Its Damages
Theories, Any Error Was Harmless

Even if Bodell Construction should have disclosed its theories more specifically,
its failure to do so was harmless and did not prejudice Appellees. As mentioned above,
Bodell Construction produced the Weight Report in a timely manner and in full
compliance with the District Court's scheduling order. The Weight Report was produced
more than four months in advance of trial. There were seven weeks of expert discovery
left. The expert discovery period is the appropriate time to inquire regarding damage

At a minimum, there was good cause for Bodell Construction's failure to disclose. See
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f). Bodell Construction's approach to discovery was typical: It
produced a report that included calculations made by a damages expert based on facts
that were disclosed during the fact-discovery period. Cf. Tyson v. Amerigroup Illinois,
Inc., 230 F.R.D. 538, 540-42, n.5 (N.D. 111. 2005) (denying motion to compel
interrogatory response regarding damages theories before beginning of expert discovery
period).
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calculations and the factual bases for those opinions. Mr. Weight had already testified as
a fact witness, was the person most knowledgeable regarding both the facts and
calculations in his damages report. Moreover, Bodell Construction made it clear that it
would allow Appellees to inquire into any factual issues relevant to the Weight Report
during Mr. Weight's deposition.
The legal theories and operative facts were also well known. Appellees' principal
argument for excluding the Weight Report was that Bodell Construction should have
identified that it intended to seek damages pursuant to the benefit of the bargain theory
during fact discovery. However, the benefit of the bargain theory is just another name for
obtaining contractual damages, which Bodell Construction disclosed as addressed above.
The benefit of the bargain theory is a well-settled method for calculating damages
on a fraud claim. In Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, 609 (Utah 1974), the Supreme
Court stated:
[T]he rule in this jurisdiction [is] that in an action for fraud and deceit the
measure of damages is the difference between the actual value of what the
party received and the value thereof if it had been as represented; this is the
benefit of the bargain rule. Under this rule the defrauded party is
compensated for the loss of his bargain and is not confined to his out-ofthe-pocket damages.
(citing Dilworth v. Lauritzen, 424 P.2d 136 (1967). See also Brown v. Richards, 840
P.2d 143, 150-51 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The benefit of the bargain rule is intended to put
the defrauded party in the position that he or she would have been in if the fraudulent
representations had been true.
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Moreover, the operative facts upon which Mr. Weight based his opinion were the
subject of exhaustive discovery and largely undisputed. Those facts include: the date
Bodell Construction made the loans, the amounts of those loans, the terms of the loans,
and the defaults on the loans.

The Utah law set forth above is well-settled and was

available to all parties. In his expert report, Mr. Weight merely applied this established
law to facts that were well-known. Therefore, any failure by Bodell Construction was
harmless.
Although trial courts have discretion to impose sanctions for violations of the
rules, the District Court's decision to strike several of Bodell Construction's damages
theories was an abuse of that discretion. First, as stated above, there was no violation of
any court order or the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, it was inappropriate
to strike the Weight Report. Second, if there was a violation it did not justify the harsh
sanction of striking the Weight Report, there was good cause for the failure and it was
harmless. See Seymour v. Consolidated Freightways, 187 F.R.D. 541, 542 (S.D. Miss.
1999) (refusing to exclude expert testimony for failure to properly and timely designate
experts). Therefore, the Weight Report should not have been stricken.

The one fact allegedly unknown to Defendants before the production of the Weight
Report was that Bodell Construction had been forced to tap into a line of credit as a result
of the defaults on the loans to MSF Properties and Jenson and had incurred interest that is
recoverable as consequential damages. However, Bodell Construction made it clear that
Mr. Weight could testify regarding this line of credit when he was deposed during the
expert discovery period. [R. 3391-92] Therefore, this did not prejudice Appellees either.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the District Court's order granting summary judgment, rule as a matter of law that
the Settlement Agreement constitutes a release as a matter of law and that it does not
release any claims against Appellees, and reverse the District Court's order striking the
Weight Report.
DATED this 30th day of April, 2008.
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.

James S. Jardine (
Matthew R. Lewis

J

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
THIS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (tins "Agreement) is entered into this 18th day of March,
2003, by and among BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a Utah corporation O^CC"), MICHAEL
BODELL, an individual ("Bodeir), MARC S. JENSON, en individual ("Jensen**), and MSF
PROPERTIES, L.C., a Utah limited liability company (?MSF*).
WHEREAS, in June and August of 2000, BCC made certain loans to MSF (the "Loans")] and
WHEREAS, Jouson personally guaranteed the obligations of MSF underthe Loans; and
WHEREAS, MSF has made partial payments against (he amounts outstanding under the Loans,
but is currently in'default under the Loans; and
WHEREAS, the parties now desire to achieve a full settlement of all obligations, disputes and
other matters outstanding between them, including, but not limited to the Loans;
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises set forth above and the covenants and
obligations set forth below, and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of
which art hereby acknowledged, the parties hereby agree as follows:
1.
Contemporaneous with the execution and delivery of this Agreement, MSF has caused
$3,000,000 in immediately available funds to be delivered to BCC. BCC hereby acknowledges receipt of
such funds.
2.
Each of BodelLand JBCC, for himself, itself their affiliates and for.all persons or entities
claiming by, through or under him, it or them, hereby (a) releases, acquits, waives and forever discharges
MSF, its affiliates and their respective members, managers, officers, employees and agents (each,
including without limitation Jenson, an "MSF Part/*) from any and all claims, allegations of fraud,
charges, demands, losses; damages, obligations, liabilities, grievances, causes of action, or suits at law
and equity of whatsoever kind and nature, expenses, costs and attorneys fees, whether known Or unknown,
suspected or unsuspected, liquidated or Unliquidated (each, a "Gain?1), arising out of all past affiliations
and transactions among Bodell, BCC-and any MSF Party, including, but not limited to, the Loans and all
related arrangements and transactions, (b) without limiting the generality of the foregoing, acknowledges
and agrees that the obligations of the MSF Parties in connection with the Loans, including all principal
and interest that may have been deemed to have accrued thereon, are hereby deemed fully satisfied and
repaid in full; provided that such releases shall not apply to any obligation of MSF or Jenson set forth in
tins Agreement to be performed or observed after the execution and delivery hereof,
3.
Each of Jenson and MSF, for himself, itself, their affiliates and for all persons or entities
claiming by, through or under biro, it or them, hereby (a) releases, acquits, waives and forever discharges
BCC, its affiliates and their respective officers, directors, employees and agents (each, including without
limitation Bodell, a "Bodell Partf\ from any and all Claims arising out of all past affiliations and
transactions among Bodell, BCC and any MSF Party including, but not limited to, tb<e Loans and all
related arrangements and transactions; provided that such releases shall not apply T£ any obligation of
BCC or Bodell set forth in this Agreement to be performed or observed after the execution and delivery
hereof.
4.
Each of the parties hereto agrees that, except as necessary to enforce the provisions hereof^ it
shall keep confidential the execution, terms and existence of this Agreement, the consideration exchanged
herein, and all other matters ia connection with this Agreement; provided thai any party may (upon
performance by the parties of the respective deliveries to be made hereunder) disclose that MSF, Jenson,
Bodell and BCC have definitively settled all matters between them as of the date hereof and provided,
further, that each party may disclose such items in confidence as appropriate to their respective tax advisors.

Annm

5.
Each of the parties hereto understand and agree thai this is a mutual release of claims and
that, following execution of this document, no Bodell Party shall have any claim against an MSF Party and
no MSF Party shall have any claim against a Bodell Party, except with respect MSFs requirement to pay
BCC 53 million as set forth herein.
6.
Tho parlies shall execute and deliver all documents, provide all information, and lake or
forbearfromall such action as may be necessary or appropriate to achieve the purposes of this Agreement.
7.
Each of BCC and MSF represents and warrants to the other parties hereto that (a) this
Agreement has been duly approved by all necessary corporate or limited liability company action and tiiat
the person executing this Agreement on its behalf has been duly authorized to do so and (b) they hava had
opportunity to consult with logal counsel of their choosing in connection with entering into this Agreement
X.
This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of Utah. Ibis Agreement
shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of the parties and their heirs, successors and assigns.
In the event legal action is commenced by any party to enforce or inte/pret this Agreement, the prevailing
party or parties in any such action shall be entitled to recover from the non-preyailing party or parties its
or their reasonable attorney fees and costs. This Agreement shall be construed as though all parties had
drafted jt This Agreement sets forth the entire understanding and agreement between the parties with
respect to the subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior negotiations, representations, understandings,
agreements or arrangements between them, whether written or oral, with rospect to the subject matter
hereof. The parties agree that this Agreement may be executed in multiple counterparts and, upon such
execution, all the counterparts taken together shall constitute one and the same agreement Counterparts
and signatures transmitted by iacsimOe^hall he valid.and effective as originals.
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IN WETNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement as of the date first set forth
above.
"BodelP:

I^U^klW

Michael Bodell

"BCC";
Bodell Constniction Company

Name:

hlsti^rU^^:^a>Si

raw rte$ip&ur
"Jonson":

"MSF":
MSF Properties, L.C.

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

David W. Tufts (8736)
Erik A. Olson (8479)
Jason R. Hull (11202)

AUG 2 2 2007
M

DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR

-' $???Uc£

111 East Broadway, Suite 900
P.O. Box 4050
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-4050
(801)415-3000
(801) 415-3500 fax
Attorneys for defendant Mark H. Robbins

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
Utah corporation,

ORDER GRANTING
MARK ROBBINS' MOTION TO
EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF
MERRILL WEIGHT

Plaintiff,
VS.

MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE &
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY,
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company;
CHEROKEE AND WALKER, L.L.C., a
Utah limited liability company; BANK
ONE, UTAH, National Association, a Utah
corporation; and DOES 1 through 50,

Case No. 030917018
Judge John Paul Kennedy

Defendants.

On July 27, 2007, at 9:00 a.m., the Court heard oral arguments on (1) Defendant Mark
Robbins' Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Merrill Weight; and (2) Defendant Mark
Robbins' Motion to Reopen Fact Discovery and Extend Expert Deadlines. Defendant IPMorgan
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Chase Banlc, N.A., successor by merger to Bank One, N.A. ("Bank One") joined in both of these
motions. Robert J. Shelby of Burbidge Mitchell & Gross appeared on behalf of Bodell
Construction Company ("Bodell"). H. Douglas Owens of Holland & Hart LLP appeared on
behalf of Banlc One. David W. Tufts and Jason R. Hull of Durham Jones & Pinegar PC appeared
on behalf of Defendant Mark Robbins ("Robbins"). Having reviewed the papers filed by the
parties in support and opposition to these motions, and having heard the arguments of counsel,,
and good cause appearing, the Court hereby FINDS and ORDERS as follows:
1.

Motion to Exclude Weight. Robbins' Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of

Merrill Weight is GRANTED. Bodell will not be allowed to present testimony at trial to
support those claims for damages that are advanced in the expert report of Merrill Weight
relating to the Benefit of the Bargain theory, the Modified Benefit of the Bargain theory, the
Reasonable Rate of Return theory, and claims for Consequential Damages. The Court holds that
the defendants will suffer prejudice if Bodell were allowed to present these damages theories at
trial because these claims and the bases for them were not disclosed during fact discovery and
defendants are now unable to conduct fact discovery to rebut those theories. Bodell has offered
no legitimate excuse for not disclosing these theories prior to the close of fact discovery. Bodell
will only be allowed to present evidence at trial on the one theory of damages that was
previously disclosed, namely, that the damages are $4 million, less payments received, plus
interest at the statutory rate. Bodell's ability to seek punitive damages, attorneys fees, and costs
under this theory of damages for the alleged fraud was not considered by the Court in this motion
and is therefore not precluded by this order.
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The Court declines to reach the questions of the legal and factual viability of the
various theories asserted by Mr. Weight. Those issues were briefed, but the Court finds that it is
unnecessary to rule on those issues at this time in light of the Court's decision to exclude the
testimony of Mr. Weight on the grounds described above.
2.

Motion to Reopen Fact Discovery and Extend Expert Deadlines. Robbins'

Motion to Reopen Fact Discovery and Extend Expert Deadlines was asserted in the alternative
and is moot because the Court has granted the Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Merrill
Weight.
3.

Other Issues. Bodell is permitted to provide a revised expert report from Merrill

Weight on the damage theory that Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company is entitled to $4
million, less payments received, plus interest at the statutory rate. Mr. Weight's revised expert
report shall be served on the defendants not later than Friday, August 3, 2007. Thereafter,
defendants shall have until August 31, 2007, to depose Mr. Weight and to serve rebuttal reports
to Mr. Weight's revised expert report. Bodell shall have until September 14, 2007, to depose this
expert designated by the defendants.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August ^ 2 0 0 7 .
JudgeJQJhn raul Kennpdy
Thijdfoistrict Court

\

Approved as to form

A. Beckstead e*
[. Douglas Owens
Holland & Hart
Attorneys for Defendant Bank One, N.A.

Robert J. Shelby
Burbidge & MitHSell
Attorneys for Plaintiff Bodell Construction Co.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on tins AJ day of August, 2007,1 caused a copy of the within and
foregoing ORDER GRANTING MARK ROBBINS' MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT
TESTIMONY OF MERRILL WEIGHT to be delivered via hand delivery to the following:

Richard D. Burbidge
Robert Shelby
Burbidge Mitchell & Gross
215 South State Street, Suite 920
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
John A. Beckstead
H. Douglas Owens
Romaine C. Marshall
Holland & Hart LLP
60 E. South temple, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1031
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John A. Beckstead, #0263
H. Douglas Owens, #7762
Romaine C. Marshall, #9654

FIIED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

HOLLAND & HART LLP

NOV 0 5 281

60 E. South Temple, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1031
Telephone: (801) 799-5800
Fax: (801)799-5700

SALT LA,vfc X C H I <

By_

\JL

Deputy Clerk

Attorneys for Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
as successor to Bank One, N.A.
m THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a
Utah corporation,

REVISED ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 030917018
V.

Hon. John Paul Kennedy
MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE &
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY,
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company;
CHEROKEE & WALKER, L.L.C., a Utah
limited liability company; BANK ONE,
UTAH, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a
national banking association, and DOES 1
through 50,
Defendant

The following Motions for Summary Judgment were filed in this action:
1.

Motion of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. for Partial Summary Judgment on Fraud

Claim dated November 29, 2006 (the "Fraud Summary Judgment Motion").

3772177_6 DOC
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2.

Mark Robbins Motion for Summary Judgment dated March 29, 2007 (the

"Robbins Motion").
3.

Bank One's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Fraud and Negligent

Misrepresentation Claims dated July 2, 2007 (the "Bank One Motion").
4.

Joinder in Defendant Bank One's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs

Fraud Claims dated July 9, 2007 (the "Robbins Joinder").
Hearing on the Fraud Summary Judgment Motion was held before this Court on April 6,
2007 and the Motion was taken under advisement.
Hearing on the Bank One Motion and the Robbins Motion was held before this Court on
September 10, 2007. At that time, the Court directed the parties to file supplemental memoranda
on the issue of the Court's authority to reconsider the order previously entered by Judge William
Bohling and scheduled further oral argument.
The further oral argument was held October 3, 2007. Appearing at that argument were
James Jardine and Matthew Lewis of Ray Quinney & Nebeker on behalf of Bodell Construction
Company ("Bodell"), John A. Beckstead and Douglas Owens of Holland & Hart on behalf of
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., successor by merger to Bank One, N.A. ("Bank One"), and David
W. Tufts and Jason R. Hull of Durham Jones & Pinegar and Andrew Deiss of Jones Waldo
Holbrook & McDonough on behalf of Defendant Mark Robbins ("Robbins").
Having reviewed the Memoranda and Exhibits filed by the parties in support of and in
opposition to these Motions, and having heard the arguments of counsel, and good cause
appearing, the Court hereby FINDS and ORDERS as follows:
3772177_6 DOC
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1.

The Court finds that it has authority to reconsider an earlier order of the Court

where there is a basis to believe the earlier order is in error and final judgment has not been
entered. The Court finds that the Order dated March 15, 2004 entered by the Hon. William
Bohling is in error and it is therefore proper for this Court to reconsider the accord and
satisfaction arguments which were the subject of the March 15, 2004 Order.
2.

The Bank One Motion is hereby granted. The ground upon which the Bank One

Motion is granted is that the Settlement Agreement dated March 18, 2003, between Bodell
Constmction Company, Michael Bodell, MSF Properties, LC, and Marc S. Jenson (the
"Settlement Agreement") constitutes an accord and satisfaction and the Court makes the
following findings, together with findings stated in the record:
a.

The Settlement Agreement is unambiguous and clear.

b.

The Settlement Agreement includes the settlement of liquidated and

unliquidated claims.
c.

The Settlement Agreement was drafted by lawyers and the parties are

sophisticated businessmen.
d.

The Settlement Agreement is an accord and satisfaction.

e.

The existence of an accord and satisfaction is shown within the "four

corners" of the Settlement Agreement.
f.

An accord and satisfaction operates for the benefit of third parties and

encompasses all claims pending before the Court, including the claims for fraud and negligent

3772177_6 DOC
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misrepresentation asserted against Bank One and the claims for fraud, civil conspiracy, and
unjust enrichment asserted against Robbins.
3.

The Court finds that Robbins has properly joined in the Bank One Motion. All of

the bases for granting the Bank One Motion with respect to the claims asserted against Bank One
apply to the claims asserted against Robbins.
4.

The Court declines to rule on the other arguments in the Bank One Motion, in the

Robbins Motion, and in the Fraud Summary Judgment Motion.
5.

The trial date of October 22, 2007, and all other dates and deadlines set by the

Court are hereby vacated.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: November J> , 2007.

Approved as to form:

JjfefesS.5. Jarcftuae
fatthew R. Lewis
Ray Quinney & Nebeker, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company
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David W\ Tuns
Jason R. Hull
Durham Jones & Pinegar, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant Mark H. Robbins

John A.
H. Douglas Owens
Romaine C. Marshall
Holland & Hart LLP
Attorneys for Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A., successor by merger to Bank One, N.A.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
, 2007,1 served a copy of the foregoing document to the
following by:
James S. Jardine
Matthew L. Lewis

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivery
Email

RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER

36 S. State Street #1400
P. O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
David W. Tufts
Jason R. Hull

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivery
Email

DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR

111 E. Broadway, Suite 900
P. O. Box 4050
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-4050
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivery
Email

James S. Lowhe
Andrew G. Deiss
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK &
MCDONOUGH

170 South Main Street, Suite 150 0
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

yf^^fer
3772177 6 DOC
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Rule 26. General provisions governing discovery.
(a) Required disclosures; Discovery methods.
(a)(1) Initial disclosures. Except in cases exempt under subdivision
(a)(2) and except as otherwise stipulated or directed by order, a party
shall, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to other parties:
(a)(1)(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number
of each individual likely to have discoverable information supporting its
claims or defenses, unless solely for impeachment, identifying the
subjects of the information;
(a)(1)(B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all
discoverable documents, data compilations, electronically stored
information, and tangible things in the possession, custody, or control
of the party supporting its claims or defenses, unless solely for
impeachment;
(a)(1)(C) a computation of any category of damages claimed by the
disclosing party, making available for inspection and copying as under
Rule 34 all discoverable documents or other evidentiary material on
which such computation is based, including materials bearing on the
nature and extent of injuries suffered; and
(a)(1)(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any insurance
agreement under which any person carrying on an insurance business
may be liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment which may be entered
in the case or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy
the judgment.
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the
disclosures required by subdivision (a)(1) shall be made within 14
days after the meeting of the parties under subdivision (f). Unless
otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, a party
joined after the meeting of the parties shall make these disclosures
within 30 days after being served. A party shall make initial disclosures
based on the information then reasonably available and is not excused
from making disclosures because the party has not fully completed the
investigation of the case or because the party challenges the
sufficiency of another party's disclosures or because another party has
not made disclosures.
(a)(2) Exemptions.

(a)(2)(A) The requirements of subdivision (a)(1) and subdivision (f) do
not apply to actions:
(a)(2)(A)(i) based on contract in which the amount demanded in the
pleadings is $20,000 or less;
(a)(2)(A)(ii) for judicial review of adjudicative proceedings or rule
making proceedings of an administrative agency;
(a)(2)(A)(iii) governed by Rule 65B or Rule 65C;
(a)(2)(A)(iv) to enforcbbbe an arbitration award;
(a)(2)(A)(v) for water rights general adjudication under Title 73,
Chapter 4 ; and
(a)(2)(A)(vi) in which any party not admitted to practice law in Utah is
not represented by counsel.
(a)(2)(B) In an exempt action, the matters subject to disclosure under
subpart (a)(1) are subject to discovery under subpart (b).
(a)(3) Disclosure of expert testimony.
(a)(3)(A) A party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any
person who may be used at trial to present evidence under Rules 702,
703, or 705 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
(a)(3)(B) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the
court, this disclosure shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or
specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or whose
duties as an employee of the party regularly involve giving expert
testimony, be accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by
the witness or party. The report shall contain the subject matter on
which the expert is expected to testify; the substance of the facts and
opinions to which the expert is expected to testify; a summary of the
grounds for each opinion; the qualifications of the witness, including a
list of all publications authored by the witness within the preceding ten
years; the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony; and a
listing of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an
expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years.
(a)(3)(C) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the
court, the disclosures required by subdivision (a)(3) shall be made
within 30 days after the expiration of fact discovery as provided by
subdivision (d) or, if the evidence is intended solely to contradict or
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rebut evidence on the same subject matter identified by another party
under paragraph (3)(B), within 60 days after the disclosure made by
the other party.
(a)(4) Pretrial disclosures. A party shall provide to other parties the
following information regarding the evidence that it may present at
trial other than solely for impeachment:
(a)(4)(A) the name and, if not previously provided, the address and
telephone number of each witness, separately identifying witnesses
the party expects to present and witnesses the party may call if the
need arises;
(a)(4)(B) the designation of witnesses whose testimony is expected to
be presented by means of a deposition and, if not taken
stenographically, a transcript of the pertinent portions of the
deposition testimony; and
(a)(4)(C) an appropriate identification of each document or other
exhibit, including summaries of other evidence, separately identifying
those which the party expects to offer and those which the party may
offer if the need arises.
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the
disclosures required by subdivision (a)(4) shall be made at least 30
days before trial. Within 14 days thereafter, unless a different time is
specified by the court, a party may serve and file a list disclosing (i)
any objections to the use under Rule 32(a) of a deposition designated
by another party under subparagraph (B) and (ii) any objection,
together with the grounds therefor, that may be made to the
admissibility of materials identified under subparagraph (C).
Objections not so disclosed, other than objections under Rules 402 and
403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, shall be deemed waived unless
excused by the court for good cause shown.
(a)(5) Form of disclosures. Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties
or ordered by the court, all disclosures under paragraphs (1), (3) and
(4) shall be made in writing, signed and served.
(a)(6) Methods to discover additional matter. Parties may obtain
discovery by one or more of the following methods: depositions upon
oral examination or written questions; written interrogatories;
production of documents or things or permission to enter upon land or

other property, for inspection and other purposes; physical and mental
examinations; and requests for admission.
(b) Discovery scope and limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of
the court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as
follows:
(b)(1) In general. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter,
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party
seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party,
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and
location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the
identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable
matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will
be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
(b)(2) A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored
information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably
accessible because of undue burden or cost. The party shall expressly
make any claim that the source is not reasonably accessible,
describing the source, the nature and extent of the burden, the nature
of the information not provided, and any other information that will
enable other parties to assess the claim. On motion to compel
discovery or for a protective order, the party from whom discovery is
sought must show that the information is not reasonably accessible
because of undue burden or cost. If that showing is made, the court
may order discovery from such sources if the requesting party shows
good cause, considering the limitations of subsection (b)(3). The court
may specify conditions for the discovery.
(b)(3) Limitations. The frequency or extent of use of the discovery
methods set forth in Subdivision (a)(6) shall be limited by the court if
it determines that:
(b)(3)(A) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or
duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more
convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive;
(b)(3)(B) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by
discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or

(b)(3)(C) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking
into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy,
limitations on the parties' resources, and the importance of the issues
at stake in the litigation. The court may act upon its own initiative
after reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under Subdivision (c).
(b)(4) Trial preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of
Subdivision (b)(5) of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of
documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under
Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation
or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's
representative (including the party's attorney, consultant, surety,
indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a snowing that the party
seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the
preparation of the case and that the party is unable without undue
hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other
means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the required
showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of
the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an
attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.
A party may obtain without the required showing a statement
concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by that
party. Upon request, a person not a party may obtain without the
required showing a statement concerning the action or its subject
matter previously made by that person. If the request is refused, the
person may move for a court order. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4)
apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion. For
purposes of this paragraph, a statement previously made is (A) a
written statement signed or otherwise adopted or approved by the
person making it, or (B) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or
other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially
verbatim recital of an oral statement by the person making it and
contemporaneously recorded.
(b)(5) Trial preparation: Experts.
(b)(5)(A) A party may depose any person who has been identified as
an expert whose opinions may be presented at trial. If a report is
required under subdivision (a)(3)(B), any deposition shall be
conducted within 60 days after the report is provided.

(b)(5)(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an
expert who has been retained or specially employed by another party
in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not
expected to be called as a witness at trial, only as provided in Rule
35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is
impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or
opinions on the same subject by other means.
(b)(5)(C) Unless manifest injustice would result,
(b)(5)(C)(i) The court shall require that the party seeking discovery
pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to
discovery under Subdivision (b)(5) of this rule; and
(b)(5)(C)(ii) With respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision
(b)(5)(A) of this rule the court may require, and with respect to
discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(5)(B) of this rule the court
shall require, the party seeking discovery to pay the other party a fair
portion of the fees and expenses reasonably incurred by the latter
party in obtaining facts and opinions from the expert.
(b)(6) Claims of Privilege or Protection of Trial Preparation Materials.
(b)(6)(A) Information withheld. When a party withholds information
otherwise discoverable under these rules by claiming that it is
privileged or subject to protection as trial preparation material, the
party shall make the claim expressly and shall describe the nature of
the documents, communications, or things not produced or disclosed
in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or
protected, will enable other parties to assess the applicability of the
privilege or protection.
(b)(6)(B) Information produced. If information is produced in
discovery that is subject to a claim of privilege or of protection as trialpreparation material, the party making the claim may notify any party
that received the information of the claim and the basis for it. After
being notified, a party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the
specified information and any copies it has and may not use or disclose
the information until the claim is resolved. A receiving party may
promptly present the information to the court under seal for a
determination of the claim. If the receiving party disclosed the
information before being notified, it must take reasonable steps to

retrieve it. The producing party must preserve the information until
the claim is resolved.
(c) Protective orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from
whom discovery is sought, accompanied by a certification that the
movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other
affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action,
and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or
alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the
district where the deposition is to be taken may make any order which
justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including
one or more of the following:
(c)(1) that the discovery not be had;
(c)(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and
conditions, including a designation of the time or place;
(c)(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery
other than that selected by the party seeking discovery;
(c)(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of
the discovery be limited to certain matters;
(c)(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons
designated by the court;
(c)(6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of
the court;
(c)(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development,
or commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a
designated way;
(c)(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or
information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by
the court.
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the
court may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order that any
party or person provide or permit discovery. The provisions of Rule
37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the
motion.

(d) Sequence and timing of discovery. Except for cases exempt under
subdivision (a)(2), except as authorized under these rules, or unless
otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, a party
may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have met
and conferred as required by subdivision (f). Unless otherwise
stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, fact discovery shall
be completed within 240 days after the first answer is filed. Unless the
court upon motion, for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in
the interests of justice, orders otherwise, methods of discovery may be
used in any sequence and the fact that a party is conducting
discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not operate to
delay any other party's discovery.
(e) Supplementation of responses. A party who has made a disclosure
under subdivision (a) or responded to a request for discovery with a
response is under a duty to supplement the disclosure or response to
include information thereafter acquired if ordered by the court or in
the following circumstances:
(e)(1) A party is under a duty to supplement at appropriate intervals
disclosures under subdivision (a) if the party learns that in some
material respect the information disclosed is incomplete or incorrect
and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been
made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in
writing. With respect to testimony of an expert from whom a report is
required under subdivision (a)(3)(B) the duty extends both to
information contained in the report and to information provided
through a deposition of the expert.
(e)(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response to
an interrogatory, request for production, or request for admission if
the party learns that the response is in some material respect
incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or corrective information
has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the
uiscovery process or in writing.
(f) Discovery and scheduling conference.
The following applies to all cases not exempt under subdivision (a)(2),
except as otherwise stipulated or directed by order.
(f)(1) The parties shall, as soon as practicable after commencement of
the action, meet in person or by telephone to discuss the nature and

basis of their claims and defenses, to discuss the possibilities for
settlement of the action, to make or arrange for the disclosures
required by subdivision (a)(1), to discuss any issues relating to
preserving discoverable information and to develop a stipulated
discovery plan. Plaintiff's counsel shall schedule the meeting. The
attorneys of record shall be present at the meeting and shall attempt
in good faith to agree upon the discovery plan.
(f)(2) The plan shall include:
(f)(2)(A) what changes should be made in the timing, form, or
requirement for disclosures under subdivision (a), including a
statement as to when disclosures under subdivision (a)(1) were made
or will be made;
(f)(2)(B) the subjects on which discovery may be needed, when
discovery should be completed, whether discovery should be
conducted in phases and whether discovery should be limited to
particular issues;
(f)(2)(C) any issues relating to preservation, disclosure or discovery of
electronically stored information, including the form or forms in which
it should be produced;
(f)(2)(D) any issues relating to claims of privilege or of protection as
trial-preparation material, including - if the parties agree on a
procedure to assert such claims after production - whether to ask the
court to include their agreement in an order;
(f)(2)(E) what changes should be made in the limitations on discovery
imposed under these rules, and what other limitations should be
imposed;
(f)(2)(F) the deadline for filing the description of the factual and legal
basis for allocating fault to a non-party and the identity of the nonparty; and
(f)(2)(G) any other orders that should be entered by the court.
(f)(3) Plaintiff's counsel shall submit to the court within 14 days after
the meeting and in any event no more than 60 days after the first
answer is filed a proposed form of order in conformity with the parties'
stipulated discovery plan. The proposed form of order shall also
include each of the subjects listed in Rule 16(b)(l)-(6), except that the
date or dates for pretrial conferences, final pretrial conference and trial

shall be scheduled with the court or may be deferred until the close of
discovery. If the parties are unable to agree to the terms of a
discovery plan or any part thereof, the plaintiff shall and any party
may move the court for entry of a discovery order on any topic on
which the parties are unable to agree. Unless otherwise ordered by the
court, the presumptions established by these rules shall govern any
subject not included within the parties' stipulated discovery plan.
(f)(4) Any party may request a scheduling and management
conference or order under Rule 16(b).
(f)(5) A party joined after the meeting of the parties is bound by the
stipulated discovery plan and discovery order, unless the court orders
on stipulation or motion a modification of the discovery plan and order.
The stipulation or motion shall be filed within a reasonable time after
joinder.
(g) Signing of discovery requests, responses, and objections. Every
request for discovery or response or objection thereto made by a party
shall be signed by at least one attorney of record or by the party if the
party is not represented, whose address shall be stated. The signature
of the attorney or party constitutes a certification that the person has
read the request, response, or objection and that to the best of the
person's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry it is: (1) consistent with these rules and warranted by existing
law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law; (2) not interposed for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase
in the cost of litigation; and (3) not unreasonable or unduly
burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the discovery
already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and the
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. If a request,
response, or objection is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is
signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the
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be obligated to take any action with respect to it until it is signed.
If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion
or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the
certification, the party on whose behalf the request, response, or
objection is made, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include

ADD 23

an order to pay the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred
because of the violation, including a reasonable attorney fee.
(h) Deposition where action pending in another state. Any party to an
action or proceeding in another state may take the deposition of any
person within this state, in the same manner and subject to the same
conditions and limitations as if such action or proceeding were pending
in this state, provided that in order to obtain a subpoena the notice of
the taking of such deposition shall be filed with the clerk of the court of
the county in which the person whose deposition is to be taken resides
or is to be served, and provided further that all matters arising during
the taking of such deposition which by the rules are required to be
submitted to the court shall be submitted to the court in the county
where the deposition is being taken.
(i) Filing.
( i ) ( l ) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a party shall not file
disclosures or requests for discovery with the court, but shall file only
the original certificate of service stating that the disclosures or
requests for discovery have been served on the other parties and the
date of service. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a party shall
not file a response to a request for discovery with the court, but shall
file only the original certificate of service stating that the response has
been served on the other parties and the date of service. Except as
provided in Rule 30(f)(1), Rule 32 or unless otherwise ordered by the
court, depositions shall not be filed with the court.
(i)(2) A party filing a motion under subdivision (c) or a motion under
Rule 37(a) shall attach to the motion a copy of the request for
discovery or the response which is at issue.

Rule 37. Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; sanctions.
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon reasonable
notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for
an order compelling discovery as follows:
(a)(1) Appropriate court. An application for an order to a party may be
made to the court in which the action is pending, or, on matters
relating to a deposition, to the court in the district where the
deposition is being taken. An application for an order to a deponent
who is not a party shall be made to the court in the district where the
deposition is being taken.
(a)(2) Motion.
(a)(2)(A) If a party fails to make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a),
any other party may move to compel disclosure and for appropriate
sanctions. The motion must include a certification that the movant has
in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the party not
making the disclosure in an effort to secure the disclosure without
court action.
(a)(2)(B) If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or
submitted under Rule 30 or 3 1 , or a corporation or other entity fails to
make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to
answer an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in
response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, fails to
respond that inspection will be permitted as requested or fails to
permit inspection as requested, the discovering party may move for an
order compelling an answer, or a designation, or an order compelling
inspection in accordance with the request. The motion must include a
certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted
to confer with the person or party failing to make the discovery in an
effort to secure the information or material without court action. When
taking a deposition on oral examination, the proponent of the question
may complete or adjourn the examination before applying for an
order.
(a)(3) Evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response. For
purposes of this subdivision an evasive or incomplete disclosure,
answer, or response is to be treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or
respond.
(a)(4) Expenses and sanctions.
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(a)(4)(A) If the motion is granted, or if the disclosure or requested
discovery is provided after the motion was filed, the court shall, after
opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose conduct
necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such conduct
or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses
incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the
court finds that the motion was filed without the movant's first making
a good faith effort to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court
action, or that the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or
objection was substantially justified, or that other circumstances make
an award of expenses unjust.
(a)(4)(B) If the motion is denied, the court may enter any protective
order authorized under Rule 26(c) and shall, after opportunity for
hearing, require the moving party or the attorney or both of them to
pay to the party or deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable
expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney fees,
unless the court finds that the making of the motion was substantially
justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses
unjust.
(a)(4)(C) If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court
may enter any protective order authorized under Rule 26(c) and may,
after opportunity for hearing, apportion the reasonable expenses
incurred in relation to the motion among the parties and persons in a
just manner.
(b) Failure to comply with order.
(b)(1) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is taken. If a
deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a question after being directed
to do so by the court in the district in which the deposition is being
taken, the failure may be considered a contempt of that court.
(b)(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party fails to
obey an order entered under Rule 16(b) or if a party or an officer,
director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under
Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an
order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made under
Subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35, , unless the court finds that the
failure was substantially justified, the court in which the action is
pending may take such action in regard to the failure as are just,
including the following:
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(b)(2)(A) deem the matter or any other designated facts to be
established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim
of the party obtaining the order;
(b)(2)(B)prohibit the disobedient party from supporting or opposing
designated claims or defenses or from introducing designated matters
in evidence;
(b)(2)(C) strike pleadings or parts thereof, stay further proceedings
until the order is obeyed, dismiss the action or proceeding or any part
thereof, or render judgment by default against the disobedient party;
(b)(2)(D) order the party or the attorney to pay the reasonable
expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure;
(b)(2)(E) treat the failure to obey an order, other than an order to
submit to a physical or mental examination, as contempt of court; and
(b)(2)(F) instruct the jury regarding an adverse inference.
(c) Expenses on failure to admit. If a party fails to admit the
genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter as requested
under Rule 36, and if the party requesting the admissions thereafter
proves the genuineness of the document or the truth of the matter,
the party requesting the admissions may apply to the court for an
order requiring the other party to pay the reasonable expenses
incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney fees. The
court shall make the order unless it finds that (1) the request was held
objectionable pursuant to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was
of no substantial importance, or (3) the party failing to admit had
reasonable ground to believe that he might prevail on the matter, or
(4) there was other good reason for the failure to admit.
(d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or serve answers to
interrogatories or respond to request for inspection. If a party or an
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated
unuei r\uit: o\J{U)\p)
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appear before the officer who is to take the deposition, after being
served with a proper notice, or (2) to serve answers or objections to
interrogatories submitted under Rule 33, after proper service of the
interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written response to a request for
inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper service of the
request, the court. on motion may take any action authorized by
Subdivision (b)(2).
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The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be excused on
the ground that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the party
failing to act has applied for a protective order as provided by Rule
26(c).
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discovery plan. If a party
or attorney fails to participate in good faith in the framing of a
discovery plan by agreement as is required by Rule 26(f), the court on
motion may take any action authorized by Subdivision (b)(2).
(f) Failure to disclose. If a party fails to disclose a witness, document
or other material as required by Rule 26(a) or Rule 26(e)(1), or to
amend a prior response to discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), that
party shall not be permitted to use the witness, document or other
material at any hearing unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the
party shows good cause for the failure to disclose. In addition to or in
lieu of this sanction, the court on motion may take any action
authorized by Subdivision (b)(2).
(g) Failure to preserve evidence. Nothing in this rule limits the
inherent power of the court to take any action authorized by
Subdivision (b)(2) if a party destroys, conceals, alters, tampers with or
fails to preserve a document, tangible item, electronic data or other
evidence in violation of a duty. Absent exceptional circumstances, a
court may not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing
to provide electronically stored information lost as a result of the
routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system.
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BODELL CONSTRUCTION CO vs. MARK H ROBBINS
NUMBER 030917018 Miscellaneous

2NT ASSIGNED JUDGE
JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
IES
Defendant Represented
Represented
Represented

MARK H ROBBINS
by: JEFFREY M JONES
by: JAMES S LOWRIE
by: DAVID W TUFTS

Defendant - CHEROKEE & WALKER INVESTMENT C
Represented by: FRANCIS M WIKSTROM
Defendant - CHEROKEE AND WLKER LLC
Represented by: FRANCIS M WIKSTROM
Other Party - JEFFREY M JONES
Defendant - BARBARA LAVERN WORTHINGTON
Defendant - JP MORGAN CHASE BANK
Represented by: JOHN A BECKSTEAD
Defendant -

BANK ONE UTAH

Plaintiff - BODELL CONSTRUCTION CO
Represented by: JOHN A BECKSTEAD
Plaintiff - BODELL CONSTRUCTION CO
Represented by: RICHARD D BURBIDGE
Plaintiff - BODELL CONSTRUCTION CO
Represented by: JAMES S JARDINE
Plaintiff -

BODELL CONSTRUCTION

CO

Represented by: JEFFREY M JONES
Plaintiff - BODELL CONSTRUCTION CO
Represented by: MATTHEW R LEWIS
Plaintiff - BODELL CONSTRUCTION CO
Represented by: ROBERT J SHELBY
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Plaintiff - BODELL CONSTRUCTION CO
Represented by: JASON R HULL
CCOUNT SUMMARY
TOTAL REVENUE

Amount Due :
Amount Paid :
Credit
Balance :

BAIL/CASH BONDS

743.00
743.00
0.00
0.00

Posted
Forfeited
Refunded
Balance

300.00
0.00
0.00
300.00

REVENUE DETAIL

TYPE: COMPLAINT 10K-MORE
Amount Due
155.00
155.00
Amount Paid
0.00
Amount Credit
0.00
Balance

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: JURY DEMAND - CIVI
Amount Due
75.00
Amount Paid
75.00
0.00
Amount Credit
0.00
Balance
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

8.25
8.25
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: CERTIFIED COPIES
Amount Due
40.00
40.00
Amount Paid
0.00
Amount Credit
0.00
Balance
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: CERTIFICATION
Amount Due
Amount Paid
Amount Credit
Balance

8.00
8.00
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: CERTIFIED COPIES
Amount Due:
7.50
Amount Paid:
7.50

-inted: 04/30/08 13:30:11
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Amount Credit:
Balance:

0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: CERTIFICATION
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

4.00
4.00
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: CERTIFIED COPIES
Amount Due:
8.00
Amount Paid:
8.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: CERTIFICATION
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

4.00
4.00
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

1.25
1.25
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

18.75
18.75
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

2.25
2.25
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

5.25
5.25
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:

1.50
1.50
0.00

Qted: 04/30/08 13:30:12
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Balance:

0.00

Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

0.75
0.75
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

18.75
18.75
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

31.00
31.00
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

1.00
1.00
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

1.75
1.75
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

1.25
1.25
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: AUDIO TAPE COPY
Amount Due:
10.00
Amount Paid:
10.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

rinted:
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1.25
1.25
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: AUDIO TAPE COPY
10.00
Amount Due
10.00
Amount Paid
0.00
Amount Credit
0.00
Balance
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

1.2 5
1.25
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

37.25
37.25
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

2.00
2.00
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

8.00
8.00
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: AUDIO TAPE COPY
10.00
Amount Due
10.00
Amount Paid
0.00
Amount Credit
0.00
Balance
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: APPEAL
Amount Due:
Amount Paid
Amount Credit
Balance
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23.00
23.00
0.00
0.00

205.00
205.00
0.00
0.00

Amount Due
Amount Paid
Amount Credit
Balance

1.50
1.50
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due
Amount Paid
Amount Credit
Balance

40.50
40.50
0.00
0.00

BAIL/CASH BOND DETAIL - TYPE: CASH BOND: Appeals
Posted By
RAY QUINNEY Sc NEBEKER
Posted:
300.00
Forfeited:
0.00
Refunded:
0.00
Balance:
300.00

LSE NOTE
Stipulated Protective Order/Dismd as to Cherokee & Walker,
L.L.C.'s
'OCEEDINGS
'-31-03
-31-03
-31-03
-31-03
-31-03
-31-03
-31-03

Filed: Complaint
Judge WILLIAM B BOHLING assigned.
Filed: Complaint 10K-MORE
Filed: Demand Civil Jury
Fee Account created
Total Due:
155.00
Fee Account created
Total Due:
75.00
COMPLAINT 10K-MORE
Payment Received:
155.00
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT 10K-MORE; Code
Description: JURY DEMAND - CIVIL
-31-03 JURY DEMAND - CIVIL
Payment Received:
75.00
'-16-03 Filed: Answer of Bank One NA
BANE: ONE UTAH
-03-03 Filed: Answer of Cherokee & Walker
CHEROKEE & WALKER INVESTMENT C
CHEROKEE AND WLKER LLC
-2 9-03 Filed: Motion for summary judgment of defendant Bank One, NA
-29-03 Filed: Memorandum in support of Bank One's motion for summary
j udgment
-12-03 Filed: Pltf Bodell Construction Company's reply memorandum in
opposition to Bank One's Motion for Summary Judgment
-12-03 Filed: Affidavit of Michael J Bodell
-24-03 Filed: Bank One's Notice of Intent to Apportion Fault Pursuant

inted: 04/30/08 13:30:12
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to Utah Code Sections 78-27-39, 78-27-41 (4) & 78-27-38 (4)(a)
1-03 Filed: Bank One's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment
4-03 Filed: Request to Submit for Decision & Request for Hearing
1-03 Filed: Cherokees & Walker's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
1-03 Filed: Cherokee & Walker's Joinder in Motion for Summary
Judgment of Defendant Bank ONe, NA
1-03 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Cherokee & Walker's Motion for •
Partial Summary Judgment
3-03 Filed: Note: Clerk is to hold Pltf's Motion for Summary
Judgment, that Deft's Motion for Summary Judgment can be heard
at the same time.
3-03 Filed: Supplemental Affidavit of Gregg Christensen
8-03 Filed: Letter to the Court from Brian Cheney, Re: postponing
Hearing on Bank One's Motion so that the two motions for
Summary Judgment can be heard at the same time, Dated 12-3-03.
5-03 Filed: Pltf Bodell Construction Company's Rule 56(f) Motion to
continue Cherokee & Walker LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment to
permit discovery
5-03 Filed: Affidavit of Richard D Burbidge
5-03 Filed: Pltf Bodell Construction Company's Memorandum in support
of Rule 56 (f) Motion to continue Cherokee & Walker LLC's
Motion for Summary Judgment to permit discovery
5-03 Filed: Pltf Bodell Construction Company's Reply Memorandum in
Opposition to Cherokee & Walker's Motion for Summary Judgment
Re: Settlement Agreement
9-03 Filed: Cert of Service (Pltf Bodell Const Co's first set of
interrogatories & request for production of documents to Bank
One, Utah)
'9-03 Filed: Cert of Service (Pltf Bodell Construction Company's
First set of Interrogatories & Requests for Production of
Documents to Cherokee & Walker Investment Company LLC &
Cherokee & Walker LLC)
H-03 Filed order: Minute Entry on Mediation (the parties "Scheduling
Order" is returned to counsel that this case may be considered
for mediation)
Judge WILLIAM B BOHLING
Signed December 31, 2003
)5-04 Filed: Reply Memorandum in Support of Cherokee and Walker's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re Settlement Agreement
(Oral Argument Requested)
D5-04 Filed: Request to Submit Cherokee & Walker's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment Re Settlement Agreement for Decision (Oral
Argument Requested)
35-04 Filed: Cherokee and Walker's Memorandum in Opposition to
Plantiff Bodell Construction Company's Rule 56(f) Motion to
Continue Cherokee and Walker, L.L.C.'s Motion for Summary
Judgment to Permit Discovery
05-04 Filed: Request for Oral Argument on Plaintiff Bodell

nted: 04/30/08 13:30:12
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Construction Company's Rule 56(f) Motino to Continue Cherokee

and Walker, L.L.C.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
1-07-04 Filed: Acceptance of Service (Jeffrey M Jones Esq on behalf of
Mark H Robbins)
1-07-04 Filed return: Summons & Complaint & Jury Demand (Jeffrey M
Jones Attny)
Party Served: ROBBINS, MARK H
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: December 31, 2003
1-13-04 Filed order: Scheduling Order (Case is trying mediation)
Judge WILLIAM B BOHLING
Signed January 13, 2 004
1-15-04 Filed: Pltf Bodell Construction Company's Reply Memorandum in
Support of Rule 56 (f) Motion to Continue Cherokee & Walker
LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment to Permit Discovery
1-15-04 Filed: Note: Both Motions for Summary Judgment may be heard at
the same hearing.
1-16-04 Filed: Cert of Serv of Deft Bank One, NA's Rule 26(a) (1)
Initial Disclosures
1-20-04 Filed: Cert of Serv (Initial Disclosures of Cherokee & Walker)
L-21-04 Notice - NOTICE for Case 030917018 ID 5836466
ALL OUTSTANDING MOTIONS is scheduled.
Date: 03/01/2004
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W42
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: WILLIAM B BOHLING
***COURTESY COPIES REQUESTED FIVE DAYS BEFORE HEARING***
L-21-04 ALL OUTSTANDING MOTIONS scheduled on March 01, 2004 at 10:00 AM
in Fourth Floor - W42 with Judge BOHLING.
L-26-04 Filed: Answer of Mark H. Robbins
MARK H ROBBINS
L-27-04
2-12-04
>-13-04
5-01-04

Filed:
Filed:
Filed:
Minute
Judge:
Clerk:
PRESENT

Certificate of Service
Joinder in Bank One's Motion for Summary Judgment
Certificate of Service
Entry - Minutes for Law and Motion
WILLIAM B BOHLING
melbar

Plaintiff's Attorney(s): RICHARD BURBIDGE
JOHN A BECKSTEAD
Defendant's Attorney(s): FRANCIS M. WIKSTROM
JAMES BLANCH
DAVID TUFTS

-inted: 04/30/08 13:30:13
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Video
Tape Number:

10:23 A.M.

ADD 36

HEARING
TAPE: 10:23 A.M. On record Before the Court are all outstanding
motions. Counsel make their arguments to the Court. The Court,
after hearing argument of counsel and having read the memoranda as
submitted, denies defendant Ban One's Motion for Summary Judgment
and
denies Cherokee & Walker's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, as
stated on the record. Counsel then argue the 56(f) motion of
Plaintiff Bodell Construction to Continue Cherokee & Walker, LLC's
Motion for Summary Judgment to Permit Discovey.
The motion is granted. Mr. Burbidge is to prepare the order.
5-04 Filed: Certificate of Service
5-04 Filed order: Order Denying Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment and Granting Plaintiff's Rule 56(f) Motion to Continue
C&W's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Judge WILLIAM B BOHLING
Signed March 15, 2004
5-04 Filed: Certificate of Service of Bank One's Responses to
Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's First Set of
Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents
1-04 Filed: Certificate of Service (Cherokee & Walker's Responses to
Plaintiff Bodell Construction Co.'s 1st Set of Interrogatories
and Requests for Production of Documents & Certificate of
Service)
i2-04 Filed: Bank One's Motion for Protective Order
>2-04 Filed: Bank One's Memorandum in Support of Motion iui
Protective Order
»8-04 Filed: Pltf Bodell Const. Co.'s Consolidated Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Compel Production of Doc's From Bank 0TH <!.
in Opposition to Bank One's Motion for Protective Order
)8-04 Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Motion to Compel
Discovery From Bank One
)8-04 Filed: Affidavit of Richard D. Burbidge
)9-04 Filed: Certificate of Service
L4-04 Filed: Certificate of Service of Defendant Robbins• Response to
Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and Request for
Production of Documents
27-04 Filed: Bank One's Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for
Protective Order and Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's
Motion to Compel
35-04 Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Reply Memorandum
in Support of Motion to Compel
05-04 Filed: Request to Submit to for Decision md Oral Argument
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(Motion to Compel Discovery from Bank One)
07-04 Filed: Request to Submit for Decision and Request for Hearing
(Motion for Protective Order)

5-13-04 Filed: Certificate of Service of Bank One's First Set of
Requests for Admissions Interrogatories, and Requests for
Production of Documents To Bodell Construction Company
5-24-04 Notice - NOTICE for Case 030917018 ID 5953235
LAW AND MOTION is scheduled.
Date: 07/28/2004
Time: 10:30 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W42
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
45 0 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: WILLIAM B BOHLING
***COURTESY COPIES ARE REQUESTED FIVE DAYS BEFORE HEARING***
5-24-04 LAW AND MOTION scheduled on July 28, 2004 at 10:30 AM in Fourth
Floor - W42 with Judge BOHLING.
S-14-04 Filed: Certificate of Service (Pltf Bodell Construction Co.'s
Responses to Bank One's 1st Set of Requests for Admissions,
Interrogatories, and Requests for Production of Doc's)
7-28-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law and Motion
Judge:
WILLIAM B BOHLING
Clerk:
melbar
PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): JOHN A BECKSTEAD
RICHARD BURBIDGE
Video
Tape Number:
10:48

HEARING
TAPE: 10:48 On record Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to
Compel and Bank One's Motion for Protective Order. The motions are
argued to the Court by counsel. The Court after hearing argument,
and having read the memoranda as submitted,
grants the Motion to Compel. Twenty days is given to respond. The
Motion for Protective Order is to remain in place.
Mr. Burbidge
is requested to prepare the order.
7-28-04 Filed: Amended Scheduling Order (Case is trying mediation)
B-05-04 Filed: Certificate of Service (Plaintiff Bodell Construction
Company's Supplemental Response to Bank One's First Set of
Requests for Admissions)
8-09-04 Filed order: Order (Motion to Compel of Bodell Construction is
granted)
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Judge WILLIAM B BOHLING
Signed August 09, 2004
B-18-04 Filed: Certificate of Service of Bank One's First Set of
Interrogatories, and Requests for Production of Documents to

Mark H. Robbins
3-04 Fee Account created
Total Due:
8.25
3-04 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
8.2 5
£-04 Filed: Notice of Issuance of Subpoenas Duces Tecum (without
testimony) Commanding Production or Inspection of Documents
4-04 Fee Account created
Total Due:
4 0.00
4-04 Fee Account created
Total Due:
^ nn
4-04 CERTIFIED COPIES
Payment Received:
4 0.00
4-04 CERTIFICATION
Payment Received:
8.00
5-04 Filed: Certificate of Service of Robbins1 First Set of
Discovery Requests to Plaintiff
6-04 Issued: Commission for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum
(without testimony)
Judge WILLIAM B BOHLING
Total Due:
7..50
7-04 Fee Account created
Total Due:
4 00
7-04 Fee Account created
0
Payment Received:
7-04 CERTIFIED COPIES
) nil
Payment Received:
7-04 CERTIFICATION
7-04 Filed: Certificate of ; vice of Robbins' First Sei ( »1
Discovery Requests to Bank One
0-04 Filed: Certificate of Service of Robbins' First Set of
Discovery Requests to Cherokee and Walker Defendants
0-04 Filed: Certificate of Service of Defendant Robbins' Response to
Bank One's First Set of Interrogatories and Request for
Production of Documents
:3-04 Filed: Certificate of Service of Bank One's Amended and
Supplemetal Responses to Plaintiff Bodell Construction
Company's First Set of Interrogatories and Request for
Production of Documents
13-04 Filed: Certificate of Service
>0-04 Filed: Certificate of Service of Bank One's Responses to
Defendant Mark H. Robbins' First Set of Discovery Requests to
Bank One
25-04 Judge BRUCE LUBECK assigned.
)l-04 Filed: Certificate of Service of Cherokee & Walker's Responses
to Defendant Mark H. Robbins1 First Set of Discovery Requests
)5-04 Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Second Set of
Interrogarories and Request for Production of Documents to Bank
One, Utah
35-04 Filed: Certificate of Service (Pltf Bodell Construction Co.'s
2nd Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of
Document to Bank One, Utah)
22-04 Fee Account created
Total Due:
8.00
22-04 Fee Account created
Total Due:
4.0 0
22-04 CERTIFIED COPIES
Payment Received:
8.0 0

nted: 04/30/08 13:30:15
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22-04 CERTIFICATION
Payment Received:
4.00
30-04 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Bank One's Motion for Leave to
File Amendment to Answer (Oral Argument Requested)
30-04 Filed: Bank One's Motion for Leave to File Amendment to Answer
03-04 Filed order: Second Scheduling Order (Case will attempt

mediation)

2-14-04
1-04-05
1-10-05
1-11-05

1-12-05

1-18-05
1-19-05

1-21-05

1-27-05
i-31-05

1-08-05
1-08-05
1-13-05
1-14-05
1-14-05
1-14-05
1-14-05
1-14-05
1-28-05
5-05-05
5-09-05

Judge BRUCE LUBECK
Signed December 02, 2004
Filed: Notice of Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum (without
testimony) Commanding Production or Inspection of Documents
Filed: Notice of Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum (without
testimony) Commanding Production or Inspection of Documents
Filed: Stipulation to Motion for Leave to File Amnedment to
Answer
Filed order: Order Granting Bank One Leave to file Amendment to
Answer
Judge BRUCE LUBECK
Signed January 11, 2 005
Filed return: Subpoena Duces Tecum (without testimony)
Party Served: OLIPHANT, ROGER
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: January 05, 2005
Filed: Motion for Order Substituting Party
Filed order: Order for Substitution of Party (JPMorgan Chase
Bank is substituted as Defendant in place of Bank One)
Defendant will still be referred to in pleadings as Bank One.
Judge BRUCE LUBECK
Signed January 19, 2 005
Filed: Certificate of Service of Bank One's Responses to
Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Second Set of
Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents
Filed: Amendment to Answer of Bank One, NA
Filed order: Stipulated Protective Order
Judge BRUCE LUBECK
Signed March 30, 2005
Filed: Bank One's Motion for Protective Order
Filed: Bank One's Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Protective Order
Filed: Notice of Videotape Deposition of Mark H. Robbins
Filed: Notice of Depositions
Filed: Deposition Subpoena
Filed: Deposition Subpoena
Filed: Notice of Depositions
Filed: Notice of Deposition
Filed: Amended Notice of Videotape Deposition of Mark H.
Robbins
Filed: Notice of Depositions
Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Second Motion to
Compel Production of Documents from Bank One

rinted: 04/30/08 13:30:15
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5-09-05 Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Consolidated
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel Production of
Documents from Bank One and in Opposition to Bank One's Motion
for Protective* Order
5-11-05 Issued: Commission for Issuance of Subpoena From Illinois
Circuit Court

-05
-05
-05
-05
-05

-05

-05
-05

•-05
;-05
*-05
$-05

1-05

1-05
1-05
1-05
1-05
9-05
3-05
3-05

3-05

Judge BRUCE LUBECK
Filed: Notice of Videotape Deposition of Marc Jenson
Filed: Certificate of Service
Filed: Notice of Records Deposition
Filed: Notice of Records Deposition
Filed return: Subpeona duces tecum
Party Served: Brent Price
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: May 16, 2005
Filed return: Amended Subpoena Duces Tecum
Party Served: Brent Price (Reg. Agent)
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: May 18, 2005
Filed: Amended Notice of Records Deposition
Filed: Certificate of Service (Plaintiff Bodell Cons Co.'s 3rd
Set of Interrogatories & 4th Set of Requests for Production of
Documents to Bank One)
Filed: Notice of Videotape Deposition of Benjamin Lightner (on
6-22-05)
Filed: Notice of Videotape Rule 30(b) (6j Deposition of
Defendant Bank One, Utah, N.A.
Filed: Notice of Videotape Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of
Defendant Cherokee and Walker, L.L.C
Filed: Notice of Videotape Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of
Defendant Cherokee & Walker Investment Company, L.L.C
dm
6/23/05)
Filed: Bank One's Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for
Protective Order and Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff
Bodell Construction Company's Second Motion to Compel
Filed: Amended Notice of Depositions
Filed: Amended Notice of Depositions
Filed: Notice of Records Deposition
Filed: Subpoena Duces Tecum (Merrill Lynch)
Filed: Amended Notice of Deposition of Michael Peterson
Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY assigned.
Filed return: Amended Deposition Subpoena
Party Served: ROBBINS, MARK H
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: June 06, 2 005
Filed return: Amended Deposition Subpoena
Party Served David Hardy
Service Type Personal
Service Date June 07, 2 0 05
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13-05 Filed return: Amended Deposition Subpoena
Party Served: David Babcock
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: June 06, 2005
13-05 Filed: Certificate of Service of Bank One's Response to
Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's 3rd Set of Requests for
Production of Documents to Bank One

'7-06-05 Filed: Certificate of service of Bank One's responses to
plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's third set of
interrogatories and fourth set of requests for production of
documents to Bank One, Utah
>8-19-05 Filed: Amended notice of videotape rule 30 (B)(6) deposition of
defendant Cherokee and Walker Investment Company, L.L.C.
18-19-05 Filed: Amended notice of videotape rule 30(b)(6) deposition of
defendant Cherokee and Walker, L.L.C.
19-07-05 Filed: Deposition of Marc Jenson no changes have been made
'9-19-05 Filed: Defendant Mark H. Robbins' motion to compel response to
discovery requests from Bank One.
19-20-05 Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Third Motion to
Compel Production of Documents from Bank One
•9-2 0-05 Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Memorandum in
Support of its Third Motion to Compel Production of Documents
From Bank One
19-21-05 Filed: Reply memorandum in support of Bodell's second motion to
compel production of documents from Bank One
0-05-05 Filed: Bank One's reply memorandum in support of its motion for
protective order and memorandum in opposition to defendant Mark
H. Robbins' motion to compel
0-07-05 Filed: Bank One's memorandum in opposition to plaintiff Bodell
Contruction Company's third motion to compel
0-12-05 Filed: Bank One's memorandum in support of motion to extend
deadline to file dispositive motions
0-12-05 Filed: Bank One's motion to extend deadline to file dispositive
motions
0-13-05 Fee Account created
Total Due:
1.25
0-13-05 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
1.25
0-13-05 Filed: Defendants Cherokee & Walker Investment Company, L.L.C.
and Cherokee and and Walker, L.L.C.'s Joinder in Bank One's
Motion to Extend Deadline to File Dispositive Motions
0-14-05 Filed: Joinder in Bank One's motion to extend deadline to file
dispositive motions
0-20-05 Filed: Reply memorandum in support of defendant Mark H.
Robbins' motion to compel response to discovery requests from
Bank One
2-07-05 Filed: Notice to Submit for decision Bank One's motion to
extend deadline to file dispositive motions
2-15-05 Filed: Notice to Submit discovery motions for decisions and
request for hearing, Re; 1-Bank one's motion for protective
order 2-Plaintiff Bodell construction company's second motion
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to compel production of documents from bank one 3-Defendant
Mark
2-19-05 Notice - NOTICE for Case 030917018 ID 6484860
DEFT'S MOTION TO EXTEND is scheduled.
Date: 01/06/2006
Time: 03:00 p.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W42
THIRD DISTRICT COURT

450 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
-05 DEFT'S MOTION TO EXTEND scheduled on January 06, 2006 at 03:00
PM in Fourth Floor - W42 with Judge KENNEDY.
-05 Fee Account created
Total Due:
V* /r>
-05 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
U ">
-05 Notice - NOTICE for Case 030917018 ID 6490938
DEFT'S MOTION TO EXTEND.
Date: 1/6/2006
Time: 03:00 p.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W42
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
The reason for the change is Court Ordered
All pending motions shall be heard on 1-6-06 at 3:00 P.M.
>-05 DEFT'S MOTION TO EXTEND scheduled on January 06, 2006 at 03:00
PM in Fourth Floor - W42 with Judge KENNEDY.
}-05 DEFT'S MOTION TO EXTEND Cancelled.
S-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law and Motion
Judge:
JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
Clerk:
melbar
PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): ROBERT SHELBY
JOHN A BECKSTEAD
Defendant' ' A1 t * >i ney (s) : DAVID W TUFTS
JAMES BLANCH
Video
Tape Number:
3:04:23
Tape Count: 4:18:45

HEARING
TAPE: 3:04:23 On record Before the Court is Motion Hearing. The
issues open for argument are, 1) Bank One •s production of bank
records, and 2) Third Set of Requests re: marketing materials.
The Court, after hearing argument of counsel, and having read the

ited: 04/30/08 13:30:16
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memoranda
as submitted, rules as stated on the record. The parties state
they will attend a mediation on February 16, 2006. Mr. Shelby is
requested to prepare the order, within five days, with ten days to
object.
25-06 Filed order: Order Regarding Outstanding Motions
Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
Signed January 25, 2 00 6
25-06 Filed order: Third Amended Scheduling Order

2-16-06
2-16-06
2-28-06
2-28-06
3-16-06
3-27-06
3-27-06
4-04-06
4-04-06
4-17-06
5-15-06
5-15-06
5-15-06

5-23-06

5-23-06

5-25-06
5-26-06
5-02-06
5-02-06
5-06-06

5-06-06
5-06-06

Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
Signed January 25, 2 0 06
Fee Account created
Total Due:
2.25
COPY FEE
Payment Received:
2.25
Fee Account created
Total Due:
5.25
COPY FEE
Payment Received:
5.25
Note: 6.00 cash tendered.
0.75 change given.
Filed: Certificate of service
Filed: Notice of videotape deposition of Benjamin Lightner
Filed: Notice of Videotape rule 30(b)(6) deposition of
defendant Bank One, Utah, N.A.
Filed: Notice of deposition of Trevor Larsen
Filed: Notice of deposition of David Babcock
Filed: Certificate of Service (Plaintiff Bodel Const. Co.'s 4th
Set of Interrogatories to Bank One, Utah)
Filed: Notice of continuation of videotape rule 30(b)(6)
deposition of defendant Bank One, Utah, N.A.
Filed: Notice of continuation of videotape rule 30(b)(6)
deposition of defendant Bank One, Utah, N.A.
Filed: Certificate of service of responses to plaintiff Bodell
Construction Company's fourth set of interrogatodries to Bank
One, Utah
Filed: Motion Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's motion
for permission to file first amended complaint to add claim for
common law fraud
Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's memorandum in
support of motion for permission to file first amended
complaint to add claim for common law fraud
Filed: Transcript of Motion hearing dated 1-6-06, Carolyn
Erickson, CCT
Filed: (Transcription) Law & Motion Hearing 1/6/06.
Fee Account created
Total Due:
1.50
COPY FEE
Payment Received:
1.50
Filed: Joint Motion for Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice of
Claims Against Cherokee & Walker Investment Company L.L.C., and
Cherokee & Walker L.L.C
Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's 4th Motion to
Compel Discovery From JP Morgan Chase Bank
Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Memorandum in
Support of 4th Motion to Compel Discovery From Defendant JP
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Morgan Chase Bank
5-06-06 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Joint Motion for Voluntary
Dismissal with Prejudice of Claims Against Cherokee & Walker
Investment Company, L.L.C, and Cherokee & Walker L.L.C.
5-06-06 Filed order: Order Granting Plaintiff Bodell Construction Co.'s
Motion for Permission to File First Amended Complaint to Add
Claim for Fraud
Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
Signed June 06, 2 006
5-07-06 Filed: Memornadum of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. in opposition to

plainitff Bodell Construction Company's motion for permission
to file first amended complaint to add claim for common law
fraud
f-06 Filed order: Order Dismissing Calims Against Cherokee & Walker
Investment Company, L.L.C., and Cherokee & Walker, L.L.C. with
Prejudice
Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
Signed June 07, 2006
)-06 Fee Account created
Total Due:
0.75
)-06 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
0.75
3-06 Filed: Plaintiff's Ex Parte Motion for Permission to File
Overlength Memorandum
L-06 Filed order: Order (Plaintiff is granted leave to file
overlength memorandum)
Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
Signed June 20, 2006
1-06 Filed: Certificate of service of JP Morgan Chase Bank, IJ »' . • s
second request for production of documents to Bodell
Construction Company
7-06 Filed: Certificate of service of Robbins second set of requests
for production of document to plaintiff
7-06 Notice - NOTICE for Case 030917018 ID 6681212
MOTION TO SET ASIDE is scheduled.
Date: 08/07/2006
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W42
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
7-06 MOTION TO SET ASIDE scheduled on Augusf 0/ ?006 at 01:30 PM in
Fourth Floor - W42 with Judge KENNEDY.
7-06 Filed: Letter to the Court from John A. Beckstead; dated
7-12-06
9-06 Filed: Certificate of service (response to defendant Mark H.
Robbins' second request for production of documents
7-06 Filed: Stipulation for Extension
1-06 Filed: Ex parte motion for leave to file overlength memorandum
in opposition to fourth motion to compel
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31-06 Filed: Affidavit of Brian Lydon in opposition to plaintiff
Bodell Construction Company's fourth motion to compel discovery
from JP Morgan Chase Bank (FILED UNDER SEAL)
31-06 Filed: memorandum of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. in opposition I i
fourth motion to compel discovery
31-06 Filed order: Order for Extension
Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
Signed July 31, 2 006
01-06 Filed order: Order Granting Ex Parte Motion for Leave to File
Overlength Memorandum in Opposition to Fourth Motion to Compel
Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY

ADD 45

Signed August 01, 2006
3-04-06 Fee Account created
Total Due:
3-04-06 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
3-07-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for Miscellaneous
Judge:
JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
Clerk:
melbar
PRESENT

18.75
18.75

Plaintiff's Attorney(s): ROBERT SHELBY
Video

Mr. Shelby requests on behalf of counsel in the above case to have
hearing of August 7, 2 006, continued to either September 11th or
September 18th, for hearing on all three outstanding motions. Mr.
Shelby will send an amended notice of hearing.
3-07-06 MOTION TO SET ASIDE rescheduled on September 18, 2006 at 10:30
AM
Reason: Counsel's request..
3-08-06 Filed: Amended notice of hearing
5-11-06 Fee Account created
Total Due:
31.00
5-11-06 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
31.00
5-12-06 Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's ex parte motion
for leave to file overlength reply memorandum in support of
fourth motion to compel discovery from defendant JP Morgan
Chase Bank, N.A.
5-12-06 Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's reply memorandum
in support of fourth motion to compel discovery from defendant
JP Morgan Chase Bank
5-13-06 Filed order: Order Granting Plaintiff Bodell Construction
Company's Ex Parte Motion for Leave to File Overlength Reply
Memorandum
Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
Signed September 13, 2006
5-18-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law and Motion
Judge:
JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
Clerk:
melbar
PRESENT

rinted: 04/30/08 13:30:18
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Plaintiff's Attorney(s): JOHN A BECKSTEAD
ROBERT SHELBY
Defendant's Attorney(s): DAVID W TUFTS
Video
Tape Number:
10:32:20
Tape Count: 11:34:25

HEARING
TAPE: 10:32:20 On record Before the Court is Motion for Leave to

Amend Complaint. The Court, after hearing argument of counsel and
having read the documents as submitted, grants the motion as stated
on the record. Mr. Shelby is to file the amended complaint by
October 13, 2 0 06.
Counsel are given to January 31, 2007 to work
out issues. Mr. Tufts is requested to prepare the order on
hearing,
by November 17, 2006.
9-06 Filed: First amended complaint
1-06 Filed order: Order Regarding Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to
Amend and Motion to Compel
Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
Signed September 21, 2006
3-06 Filed: Answer
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK
9-06 Filed: Memorandum in support of motion of JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A. for partial summary judgment on fraud claim
(oral
argument requested)
9-06 Filed: Motion of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. for partial summary
judgment on fraud claim
8-07 Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion of JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. for Partial
Summary Judgment
8-07 Fee Account created
Total Due:
I
8-07 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
1.0 0
8-07 Filed: Transcript of hearing on motions dated 9-18-06, Carolyn
Erickson, CCT
6-07 Filed: Stipulation Re: Discovery Matters
:9-07 Filed: Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion of JP Morgan Chase
Bank, N.A. for Partial Summary Judgment on Fraud Claim
!9-07 Filed: Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion of JP Morgan Chase
Bank, N.A. For Partial Summary Judgment on Fraud Claim
H-07 Filed: Note: because of illness of counsel and upon agreement
by all counsel, the report due today regarding mediation is
extended to Feb. 10, 2007.
)l-07 Filed: Request to Submit for Decision (oral aiquinenl i^quesLetlj
)7-07 Filed: Status Report

ited: 04/30/08 13:30:18
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21-07 Filed: Notice of Continuation of Rule 30(b)(6) Depostition of
Defendant Bank One, Utah, N.A.
23-07 Notice - NOTICE for Case 030917018 ID 11026260
PARTIAL SUMM JGMT& SCHED CONF is scheduled.
Date: 04/06/2007
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W42
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
23-07 PARTIAL SUMM JGMT& SCHED CONF scheduled on April 06, 2007 at
09:00 AM in Fourth Floor - W42 with Judge KENNEDY.

2-27-07 Filed: Certificate of Service (plaintiff bodell construction
company's fifth set of interrogatories to bank one, Utah)
3-23-07 Filed: Certifidate of Service of Responses to Plaintiff Bodell
Construction Company's Fifth Set of Interrogatories to Bank
One, Utah
3-26-07 Filed: Certificate of Service of Defendant Mark Robbins'
Initial Disclosures
3-26-07 Fee Account created
Total Due:
1.75
3-26-07 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
1.75
3-28-07 Filed: Notice of Videotaped Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of
Defendant Bank One, Utah, N.A.
3-30-07 Filed: Mark Robbins' Motion for Summary Judgment
Filed by: ROBBINS, MARK H
3-30-07 Filed: Affidavit of Mark Robbins in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment
3-30-07 Filed: Memorandum Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment of
Defendant Mark Robbins
4-05-07 Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Supplemental
Materials in Opposition to Defendant Bank One's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment
4-06-07 JURY TRIAL scheduled on October 22, 2007 at 09:00 AM in Fourth
Floor - W42 with Judge KENNEDY.
4-06-07 JURY TRIAL scheduled on October 23, 2007 at 09:00 AM in Fourth
Floor - W42 with Judge KENNEDY.
4-06-07 JURY TRIAL scheduled on October 24, 2007 at 09:00 AM in Fourth
Floor - W42 with Judge KENNEDY.
4-06-07 JURY TRIAL scheduled on October 25, 2007 at 09:00 AM in Fourth
Floor - W42 with Judge KENNEDY.
4-06-07 JURY TRIAL scheduled on October 26, 2007 at 09:00 AM in Fourth
Floor - W42 with Judge KENNEDY.
4-06-07 JURY TRIAL scheduled on October 29, 2007 at 09:00 AM in Fourth
Floor - W42 with Judge KENNEDY.
4-06-07 JURY TRIAL scheduled on October 30, 2007 at 09:00 AM in Fourth
Floor - W42 with Judge KENNEDY.
1-06-07 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law and Motion
Judge:
JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
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Clerk:
PRESENT

melbar

Plaintiff's Attorney(s): ROBERT SHELBY
Defendant's Attorney(s): JOHN A BECKSTEAD
JASON HULL
ERIC OLSEN
Other Parties: ROBERT SHELBY
Video
Tape Number:
9:05
Tape Count: 10:30

HEARING

Ann AH

TAPE: 9:05 On record Bank One's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on Bodell Construction's Fraud Claim is before the Court.
The Court, after hearing argument of counsel, and having viewed
the exhibits as shown, reserves ruling on the motion, and sets
further hearing on September 22, 2007 at 9:00 A.M. (all motions).
Motion cutoff is set on July 1, 2 007, with response due by July
21, 2007. A 7 day jury trial is set to begin on October 22, 2007
at 9:00 A.M. Counsel are to stipulate to jury instructions and
jury voir dire.
Mr. Shelby is to prepare an order on hearing and notice of trial.
The Court, after hearing argument of counsel, having reviewed the
documents as submitted,
JURY TRIAL is scheduled.
Date: 10/22/2007
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W42
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
45 0 SOUTH STATE
• SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
JURY TRIAL.
Date: 10/23/2007
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W42
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
JURY TRIAL.
Date: 10/24/2007
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W42
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
JURY TRIAL.
Date: 10/25/2007
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W42
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
JURY TRIAL.

Date: 10/26/2007
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W42
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
JURY TRIAL.
Date: 10/29/2007
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W42
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
JURY TRIAL.
Date: 10/30/2007
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W42
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
1-06-07 ALL PENDING MOTIONS scheduled on September 10, 2007 at 09:00 AM
in Fourth Floor - W42 with Judge KENNEDY.
5-23-07 Filed: Mark Robbins' Rule 9(1) Designation of Non-Party for
Allocation of Fault
5-24-07 Filed: Notice of Change of Address (John A. Beckstead)
5-29-07 Filed order: Scheduling Order and Order on Motions (the parties
are to report to the Court in writing by 9-22-07, their good
faith efforts at mediation)
Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
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Signed May 25, 2007
7-02-07 Filed: Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Merrill Weight
Filed by: ROBBINS, MARK H
7-02-07 Filed: Ex Parte Motion for Expedited Hearing of (1) Motion to
Exclude Expert Testimony of Merrill Weight and (2) Motion to
Reopen Fact Discovery and Extend Expert Deadlines
Filed by: ROBBINS, MARK H
7-02-07 Filed: Motion to Reopen Fact Discovery and Extend Expert
Deadlines
Filed by: ROBBINS, MARK H
7-02-07 Filed: Memorandum in Support of (1) Motion to Exclude Expert
Testimony of Merrill Weight and (2) Motion to Reopen Fact
Discovery and Extend Expert Deadlines
7-03-07 Filed: Bank One's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's
Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims
Filed by: JP MORGAN CHASE BANK,

1-07 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Bank One's Motion for Summary
Judgment on Plaintiff's Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation
Claims
)-07 Filed: Joinder in Defendant Bank One's Motion for Summary
Judgment on Plaintiff's Fraud Claims
I-07 Filed: Ex Parte Motion for Expedited Hearing of Bank One's
Motion to Extend Expert Deadlines
Filed by: JP MORGAN CHASE BANK,
$-07 Filed: Bank One's Joinder in Robbins Motion to Exclude Expert
Testimony of Merrill Weight and Motion to Extend Expert
Deadlines
3-07 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Bank One's Joinder in Robbins
Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Merrill Weight and Motion
to Extend Expert Deadlines
3-07 Notice - NOTICE for Case 030917018 ID 11165056
EX PARTE MOTION TO EXTEND is scheduled.
Date: 07/27/2007
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W42
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
3-07 EX PARTE MOTION TO EXTEND scheduled on July 27, 2007 at 09:00
AM in Fourth Floor - W42 with Judge KENNEDY.
3-07 EX PARTE MOTION TO EXTEND scheduled on July 27, 200/ at 09:00
AM in Fourth Floor - W42 with Judge KENNEDY.
6-07 Filed: Certificate of Service of Notice of Deposition of Gary M
Schwartz
6-07 Filed: Joinder in Defendant Bank One's Motion to Extend Expert
Deadlines
6-07 Filed: Objection to Bank One's Notice of Deposition of Gary M
Schwartz
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L8-07 Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant Bank One's Joinder in Robins' Motion to
Extend Expert Deadlines
L8-07 Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Consolidated
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Mark Robbins' Motions:
(1) to Exclude Testimony of Merrill Weight, and (">) to Reopen
Fact Discovery and Extend Expert Deadlines
25-07 Filed: Reply Memorandum in Support of (1) Motion to Exclude
Expert Testimony of Merrill Wight and (2) Motion to Reopen Fact
Discovery and Extend Expert Deadlines
25-07 Filed: Notice of Allocation of Fault Pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
78-27-41(4) and U.R.C.P. 9(1)
26-07 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Bank One's Motion to Exclude
Portions of the Expert Testimony of Gary Schwartz
26-07 Filed: Bank One's Motion to Exclude Portions of the Expert
Testimony of Gary Schwartz
Filed by: BANK ONE UTAH,

7-26-07 Filed: Ex Parte Motion for Expedited Hearing of Bank One's
Motion to Exclude Portions of the Expert Testimony of Gary
Schwartz
Filed by: JP MORGAN CHASE BANK,
7-27-07 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law and Motion
Judge:
JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
Clerk:
melbar
PRESENT
Plaintiffs Attorney (s): ROBERT J SHELBY
Defendant's Attorney(s): DAVID W TUFTS
DOUGLAS OWENS
Video
Tape Number:
9:03:40
Tape Count: 9:45:15

HEARING
TAPE: 9:03:40 On record Before the Court is Defendants' Ex Parte
Motion to Extend Expert Witness Time, Motion to Exclude Expert
Testimony of Merrill Wight, and Motion to Reopen Fact Discovery.
The Court, after hearing argument of counsel, and having reviewed
the documents as submitted, grants motion to Strike Testimony of
Merrill Wight. Mr. Tufts is to prepare an order on hearing.
7-27-07 Fee Account created
Total Due:
1.25
7-27-07 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
1.25
B-03-07 Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Mark
Robbins
3-03-07 Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Motion for Leave
to File Overlong Memorandum
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Filed by: BODELL CONSTRUCTION CO,
3-03-07 Filed order: Order Granting PLaintiff Bodell Construction
Company's Motion for Leave to File Overlength Memorandum
Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
Signed August 03, 2007
3-03-07 Filed: Certificate of Service
3-08-07 Fee Account created
Total Due:
10.00
3-08-07 AUDIO TAPE COPY
Payment Received:
10.00
3-08-07 Note: Aaron Munro Visa on behalf of Burbidge & Mitchell
3-08-07 Fee Account created
Total Due:
1.25
3-08-07 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
1.25
3-09-07 Fee Account created
Total Due:
10.00
3-09-07 AUDIO TAPE COPY
Payment Received:
10.00
3-14-07 Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's
's Memorandum in
Opposition to Bank One's Motion for Summary Judgment
3-17-07 Filed: Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for JP Morgan Chase Bank,
N.A.
Filed by: MURRAY, TYLER L

Ann so

-07 Filed: Certificate of Service of Expert Report of Robert
Haertel
-07 Filed order: Order Granting Mark Robbins' Motion to Exclude
Expert Testimony of Merrill Weight
Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
Signed August 22, 2007
-07 Filed: Notice of Substitution of Counsel
-07 Filed order: Order Granting Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for
JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Tyler Murray, Brian C. Cheney,
Emily V. Smith and Snell and Wilmer)
Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
Signed August 23, 2007
-07 Filed: Objection to Subpoena to Merrill Weight for (1) Taking
of Deposition and (2) Production of Documents
r
-07 Filed: Subpoena for (1) Taking of Deposition and (2) Production
of Documents
'-07 Filed: Notice of Deposition of Merrill Weight
1-07 Filed: Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Bank
One's Reply in Support of Summary Judgment Motion
Filed by: JP MORGAN CHASE BANK,
L-07 Filed: Reply in Support of Bank One's Motion for Summary
Judgment on Plaintiff's Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation
Claims
1-07 Filed order: Order Granting Unopposed Motion for Extension of
Time to File Bank ONe's Reply In Support of Summary Judgment
Motion
Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
Signed September 04, 2 007
4-07 Filed: Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant Mark Robbins1
Motion for Summary Judgment
7-07 Fee Account created
Total Due:
1.25
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7-07 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
1.25
0-07 LAW AND MOTION scheduled on October 03, 2007 at 08:30 AM in
Fourth Floor - W42 with Judge KENNEDY.
.0-07 Notice - NOTICE for Case 030917018 ID 11219305
LAW AND MOTION is scheduled.
Date: 10/03/2007
Time: 0 8:30 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W42
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84114-1860
before Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
LO-07 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law and Motion
Judge:
JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
Clerk:
amberlw
PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): JASON R HULL
JAMES S JARDINE

ADD S3

MATTHEW R LEWIS
Defendant's Attorney(s): JOHN A BECKSTEAD
DAVID W TUFTS
Video
Tape Number:
9:02:38
Tape Count: 10:39:28

HEARING
TAPE: 9:02:38 On record before the Court is Robbin's Motion for
Summary Judgment and Bank One's Motion for Summary Judgment. This
matter will be taken under advisement.
Mr. Jardine is to prepare a brief reconsidering Judge Bohling's
2004 ruling by 9/17.
Response is due by 9/27.
LAW AND MOTION is scheduled.
Date: 10/03/2007
Time: 08:30 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W42
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
45 0 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84114-1860
before Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
9-11-07 Fee Account created
Total Due:
37.25
9-11-07 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
37.25
Note: 3 8.00 cash tendered.
0.75 change given.
9-14-07 Filed: Stipulated Motion to Extend Time to File Motions in
Limine and Opposition Briefs
Filed by: BODELL CONSTRUCTION CO,
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9-14-07 Filed order: Order Granting Stipulated Motion for Extension of
Time to File Motions in Limine (to 9-28-07), and Opposition
Briefs (to Oct. 10, 2007)
Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
Signed September 14, 2007
9-17-07 Fee Account created
Total Due:
2.00
9-17-07 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
2.00
9-18-07 Filed: Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum Regarding Defendant
Bank One's Request to Reconsider the Prior Ruling on Accord and
Satisfaction
9-26-07 Filed: Bodell Construction Company's Witness List
9-26-07 Filed: Joint Statement Regarding Parties Good Faith Efforts at
Mediation
9-26-07 Filed: Joint Statement of the Case
9-26-07 Filed: Defendant Mark Robbins' Witness List
9-26-07 Filed: Witness List of JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA
9-26-07 Filed: Stipulated Voir Dire and non-Stipulated Voir Dire
Questions Requested by Each Party
9-26-07 Filed: Bank One's Supplemental Memorandum Regarding the Court's
Authority to Reconsider the Prior Ruling on Accord and

Satisfaction
-07 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Bank One's Motion in Limine No.
4: Exclusion of Evidence of Wealth or Financial Contradiction
-07 Filed: Bank One's Motion in Limine No. 4: Exclusion of
Evidence of Wealth or Financial Condition
Filed by: JP MORGAN CHASE BANK,
-07 Filed: Bank One's Motion in Limine No. 2: Exclusion of
Evidence of Certain Documents Not Relied Upon by Bodell
Filed by: JP MORGAN CHASE BANK,
-07 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Bank One's Motion in Limine No.
2: Exclusion of Evidence Certain Documents Not Relied Upon by
Bodell
-07 Filed: Bank One's Motion in Limine No. 3: Exclusion of
Evidence of Other Bank one Lawsuits
Filed by: JP MORGAN CHASE BANK,
-07 Filed return: Subpoena and Witness Fee (Benjamin LiqhLnei)
Party Served: LIGHTNER, BENJAMIN
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: September 22, 2007
r
-07 Filed: Order on Bank One's Motion in Limine No. 2: Exclusion
of Evidence of Certain Documents not Relied Upon by Bodell
f-07 Filed: Order on Bank One's Motion in Limine No. 4: Exclusion
of Evidence of Wealth or Financial Condition
5-07 Filed: (Proposed) Order Granting Plaintiff Bodell Construction
Company's Motion in Limine Requesting Spoliation Sanctions for
Lost or Destroyed Bank One Account Records and Bank One's
Failure to Comply with Rule 30(B) (6)
3-07 Filed: (Proposed) Order Granting Motion in Limine to Exclude
Loan and Escrow Agreements Purportedly Executed by Arimex
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8-07 Filed: (Proposed) Order Granting Motion in Limine to Exclude
the Proposed Expert Report and Testimony of Ronald Haertel
8-07 Filed: (Proposed) Order Granting Plaintiff Bodell Construction
Company's Motion in Limine Requesting Spoliation Sanctions for
Lost or Destroyed Bank One Account Records and Bank One's
Failure to Comply with Rule 30(B) (6)
8-07 Filed: (Proposed) Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion in Limine
to Exclude Cherokee and Walker and Certain Non-Parties From
Apportionment of Fault
il-07 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Bank One's Motion in Limine No.
3: Exclusion of Evidence of Other Bank One Lawsuits
11-07 Fee Account created
Total Due:
8.On
11-07 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
8.00
Note: 2 0.00 cash tendered.
12 change given.
)l-07 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Defendant Mark Robbins' Eighth
Motion in Limine: Exclusion of Testimony of David Babcock and
Trevor Larsen Relating to Sales by Wasatch Cycles Prior to
January 2 001
)l-07 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Defendant Mark Robbins' Seventh
Motion in Limine Against an Advisory Jury on Plaintiff's Unjust
Enrichment Claim

Ann fis

0-01-07 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Defendant Mark Robbins' Fifth
Motion in Limine: Exclusion of Settlement Discussions and
Offers
0-01-07 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Defendant Mark Robbins* Third
Motion in Limine: Exclusion of Evidence of Robbins' Financial
Condition and Wealth
0-01-07 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Defendant Mark Robbins' Second
Motion in Limine: Exclusion of Evidence of Conspiracy with
"Known" Individuals
0-01-07 Filed: Defendant Mark Robbins' Motions in Limine
Filed by: ROBBINS, MARK H
0-01-07 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Defendant Mark Robbins' Ninth
Motion in Limine: Exclusion of Questioning and Evidence
Relating to Gifts Rumored to be Given to Benjamin Lightner by
Mark Robbins
0-01-07 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Defendant Mark Robbins' Fourth
Motion in Limine: Exclusion of Expert Testimony of Merrill
Weight
0-01-07 Filed: Motion in Limine to Exclude Loan and Escrow Agreements
Purportedly Executed by Arimex
Filed by: BODELL CONSTRUCTION CO,
0-01-07 Filed: Notice of Entry of Appearance of Counsel (James Lowrie)
0-01-07 Filed: Joinder in Defendant Mark Robbin's Fourth Motion in
Limine: Exclusion of Expert Testimony of Merrill Weight
0-01-07 Filed: Motion in Limine to Exclude the Proposed Expert Report
and Testimony of Ronald Haertel
Filed by: BODELL CONSTRUCTION CO,
0-01-07 Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Motion in Limine
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D-01-07

D-01-07

3-01-07

D-01-07

D-01-07
D-01-07

Requesting Spoliation Sanctions for Lost or Destroyed Bank One
Account Records and Bank One's Failure to Comply with Rule
30(B) (6)
Filed by: BODELL CONSTRUCTION CO,
Filed: Memorandum in Support of Defendant Mark Robbins' First
Motion in Limine: Exclusion of Evidence of Other Lawsuits
Involving Robbins
Filed: Plaintiff's Motion in Limine to Exclude Cherokee and
Walker and Certain Non-Parties from Apportionment of Fault
Filed by: BODELL CONSTRUCTION CO,
Filed: Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion in Limine to
Exclude Cherokee and Walker and Certain Non-Parties from
Apportionment of Fault
Filed: Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion in Limine to
Exclude the Proposed Expert Report and Testimony of Ronald
Haertel
Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine to Exclude
Loan and Escrow Agreements Purportedly Executed by Arimex
Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Memorandum in
Support of Its Motion in Limine Requesting Spoliation sanctions
for Lost or Destroyed Bank One Account Records and Bank One's
Failure to Comply with Rule 30(B) (6)

AfinfiR

L-07 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Defendant Mark Robbins' Sixth
Motion in Limine: Exclusion of Evidence of Secondary
Conspiracy
2-07 Filed: Joint Submittal of Stipulated and Disputed Jury
Instructions
1-01 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law and Motion
Judge:
JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
Clerk:
amberlw
PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): JOHN A BECKSTEAD
JASON R HULL
JAMES S JARDINE
MATTHEW R LEWIS
Defendant's Attorney(s): DAVID W TUFTS
Audio
Tape Number:
8:35:20
Tape Count: 9:25:27

HEARING
TAPE: 8:35:20
COUNT: 9:25:2
On record before the Court is Law and Motion. After hearing
argument of counsel, the Court rules as stated on the record. Mr
Beckstead is to prepare the order. All future hearing and trial
dates are stricken.
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Doug Owens and Andrew Dice also appear.
JURY TRIAL Cancelled.
Filed: Joint Exhibit List
Fee Account created
Total Due:
10.00
AUDIO TAPE COPY
Payment Received:
10.0 0
Filed: Judgment (Unsigned)
Filed: Order Granting Summary Judgment (Unsigned)
Filed: Verified Memorandum of Costs of Defendant mark H.
Robbins
9-07 Filed: Transcript of Motion hearing dated October 3, 2007,
Carolyn Erickson, CCT
(5-07 Filed order: Revised Order Granting Summary Judgment
Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
Signed November 05, 2 007
>5-07 Case Disposition is Judgment
Disposition Judge is JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
16-07 Filed: Verified Memorandum of Costs
.4-07 Filed: Bodell Construction's Objection to Defendants' Verified
Memoranda of Costs and Motion to Tax Costs
.6-07 Fee Account created
Total Due:
23.00
.6-07 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
23.00
Note: 40.00 cash tendered.
17 change given.
>7-07 Filed: Bank One's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Tax Costs
3-07
3-07
2-07
2-07
4-07
4-07
4-07

1-27-07 Filed: Defendant Mark Robbins' Response to Bodell Construction
Company's Objection to Defendants' Verified Memoranda of Costs
and Motion to Tax Costs
1-30-07 Filed: Notice of Bond
1-30-07 Filed: Notice of Appeal
1-30-07 Fee Account created
Total Due:
205.00
1-30-07 APPEAL
Payment Received:
205.00
Note: Code Description: APPEAL
1-3 0-07 Bond Account created
Total Due:
3 0 0.00
1-3 0-07 Bond Posted
Payment Received:
3 00.00
2-03-07 Filed: NOTICE OF APPEAL
2-03-07 Note: Cert/Copy of Notice of Appeal and Notice of Bond
forwarded to Utah Court of Appeals-Fee Paid
2-06-07 Fee Account created
Total Due:'
1.50
2-06-07 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
1.50
Note: 5.0 0 cash tendered.
3.5 change given.
2-07-07 Filed: Reply in support of Bodell Construction's Objection to
Defendants' Verified Memoranda of Costs and Motion to Tax Costs
2-11-07 Filed: Supreme Court of Utah Letter to Counsel- Notice of
Appeal has been filed-20070951-SC
2-11-07 Filed: Supreme Court of Utah-Order-Effective twenty days from
Date of this Order-Case will Transfer to Utah Court of
Appeals-2 0 070951-SC
2-12-07 Filed: Request for Transcript
2-12-07 Filed: Request to Submit for Decision Plaintiff's Motion to Tax
Costs
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>-2 8-07 Minute Entry - MINUTE ORDER
Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
In view of the fact that an appeal in this matter is
pending, the Court shall refrain from ruling on the issues of costs
until the appeal is resolved.

Dated this

day of
, 20

Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
L-07-08 Filed: Transcript of Motion for Summary
9-10-07, Carolyn Erickson, CCT
L-07-08 Filed: Transcript of Hearing on Motions
Erickson, CCT
L-07-08 Filed: Transcript of Motion for Partial
hearing dated 4-6-07, Carolyn Erickson,
L-07-08 Filed: Transcript of Hearing on Motions
Erickson, CCT
L-07-08 Filed: Transcript of Hearing on Motions

Judgment hearing dated
dated 7-27-07, Carolyn
Summary Judgment
CCT
dated 7-28-04, Carolyn
dated 3-1-04, Carolyn

Erickson, CCT
7-08 Issued: Notice of Filing Transcripts on Appeal, Carolyn
Erickson, CCT
Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
1-08 Filed: Utah Court of Appeals - Letter to James S. Jardine This case has been assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals. The
case number will remain the same with the exception that it
will have a -CA after the number. - 20070951-CA
3-08 Filed: Utah Court of Appeals - Letter to Carolyn Erickson Please notify the Court of Appeals withing five days as to the
status of the transcript. - 20070951-CA
8-08 Filed: Record Index
8-08 Note: Cert/Copy of Record Index forwarded to Utah Court of
Appeals
2-08 Fee Account created
Total Due:
40.50
2-08 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
40.50
3-08 Note: Record checked out to attorney Matthew Lewis
(801-323-3480): Files-15, Transcripts-8.
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Utah Code Annotated § 15-1-1. Interest rates — Contracted rate — Legal rate.
(1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest for the loan or
forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action that is the subject of their contract.
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the legal rate
of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action shall be
10% per annum.
(3) Nothing in this section may be construed in any way to affect any penalty or
interest charge that by law applies to delinquent or other taxes or to any contract or
obligations made before May 14, 1981.

Amended by Chapter 79, 1989 General Session

WEALTH/MANAGEMENT

August 22, 2000

To:

Whom it may concern

_

JSS

8ANKZS0NE

Re:

MadTrax Group, LLC

Gentlemen.
MadTrax Group, LLC (the "Company") and its individual members
Mark Robbins and Marc Jenson (the "Members") will be depositing $165,000,000 into
Bank One, Utah NA- The funding is coming from a loan agreement between MadTrax
Group, LLC, a Utah limited liability company and Arimex Investments, LTD., a
Bahamian corporation. The sum of $165,000,000 will be deposited into an interest
bearing account in the name of the Company and managed by its Members.
Should you have any questions with respect to this matter, please contact the
Undersigned,

tejyjughmer
Wealth Aovisor
Private Banking Group

Bodell v Robbins
Deposition Exhibit No 402

50 WEST BROADWAY SUITE 200 SALT U K L CITY UT $4lCn
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